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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Police were investigating an aggravated robbery at a Sears department store. They had received information that a suspect, the appellant, was staying in a dilapidated garage apartment adjacent to a house destroyed by fire. When the police entered the premises the day after learning of the appellant’s whereabouts, they did so without a warrant and found him asleep on a mattress on the floor. Subsequent to the arrest, the officers searched a backpack next to the appellant and seized a knife found within. The appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, with use of the knife constituting the aggravating factor. Counsel for the defense filed a general pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized after the arrest. The written motion asserted: “The Defendant would show that he was arrested without a valid warrant and/or probable cause and exigent circumstances in violation of his rights as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. IV, & XIV, and Tex. Const. Art. 1 sec 9. Defendant would further show that the alleged incriminating evidence was seized as a result of an illegal search that was not valid and not supported by adequate probable cause, and not pursuant to a warrant that authorized the search of the defendant or the place where the Defendant was located and was not supported by a valid consent to search. Any use of such illegally obtained evidence would violate the Defendant’s right as set forth in Art. 38.23 V.A.C.C.P., in addition to the before-mentioned Constitutional provisions.” A pretrial hearing was held on the matter, at the conclusion of which the prosecutor argued that the appellant lacked standing to contest the police officers’ entry into the building, that the officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant and that their search of his backpack was a valid search incident to that legal arrest. The appellant’s counsel confined his argument almost exclusively to the issue of standing, arguing that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage apartment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the evidence was introduced at trial. A jury found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant asserted that the trial court erred to deny the motion to suppress because the initial entry and search of the residence without a warrant was in violation of both the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution. Additionally, he argued that his arrest without a warrant violated the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Art. I �9 of the Texas Constitution, as well as Chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The 6th Court of Appeals overruled all constitutional objections, but did hold that the appellant’s arrest violated Chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and that any evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should have been suppressed in accordance with Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In holding that appellant preserved error under Chapter 14, the court of appeals relied on the appellant’s closing argument during the motion to suppress hearing. While appellant did not explicitly reference Chapter 14, the court of appeals believed that appellant in fact invoked Chapter 14 by it alluded to a warrantless arrest and utilizing terminology from Article 14.05 of that chapter. The state filed a petition for discretionary review. HOLDING:The CCA reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court stated: “Given that the appellant’s motion to suppress focused exclusively on alleged constitutional error, and that appellant’s counsel concentrated so much of his time and energy at the pretrial hearing on the issue of”standing’ to challenge the home entry, we cannot agree that either the trial court or opposing counsel had fair notice that the provisions of Chapter 14 were also in play. “Moreover, even assuming that it should have been apparent to both the trial court and the State that the appellant’s counsel was invoking Article 14.05, we do not understand how that can justify the court of appeals’ conclusion that the appellant was entitled to a new trial on the basis that he was”obviously’ alerting the trial court to a violation of a wholly separate statute, Article 14.03(a)(1). “We hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the appellant had obviously raised the issue of the legality of his arrest under Chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” OPINION:Price, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Womack, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey and Cochran, JJ., joined. DISSENT: Holcomb, J., dissented without an opinion.

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