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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Candlelight Estates is a residential subdivision in Houston’s northwest quadrant. The northern boundary of sections one and two of the subdivision is marked by a Harris County Flood Control District (the district) drainage ditch. Rosslyn Road runs through northwest Houston in a generally north-south direction, but for want of a bridge, there is no through traffic across the drainage ditch. Accordingly, the road dead ends on both sides of the ditch. Candlelight sought to facilitate the development of its property north of the ditch by constructing a bridge across the drainage ditch on Rosslyn Road. Candlelight sought approval from the district. In 2001, the district approved Candlelight’s request to construct a bridge across the ditch. However, the proposed construction provoked opposition from citizens living in sections one and two of Candlelight Estates. Nevertheless, the city of Houston issued a permit for construction of the bridge. Homeowners in the area sought an injunction in the 157th District Court against the city, Candlelight, and others to prohibit the construction of the bridge, contending that such construction constituted trespass and nuisance, violated �11.086 of the Texas Water Code and was an unconstitutional taking of their property. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the homeowners did not suffer a taking under the Texas Constitution and, thus, suffered no injury. We held the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction because claims of inverse condemnation must be filed in the county court. For reasons that are not entirely clear in our record, Candlelight subsequently abandoned its plan to build the bridge as designed. The original plan called for the bridge to be built on box culverts. Thereafter, Candlelight sought to build a “span” bridge across ditch, apparently necessitating an application for a new permit. In March 2004, Candlelight submitted to the city its plans to construct paving and drainage facilities in conjunction with the installation of the Rossyln Road bridge. On Oct. 11, 2005, the city once again approved Candlelight’s permit to construct a bridge across the ditch. Shortly thereafter, Concerned Community Involved Development Inc. (CCID), a nonprofit corporation organized to protect the homes and properties of landowners in the vicinity of the proposed bridge, filed an application for injunctive relief in the 281st District Court. CCID alleged the permit issued by the city is void, because it was based on “secret proceedings” that violated CCID members’ rights to 1. federal due process under the federal constitution; 2. due course of law under the state constitution; 3. the Open Meetings Act; and 4. the Public Information Act. CCID also sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. �1983. The city again filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging CCID lacked standing to bring its claims, that CCID is essentially making another inverse condemnation claim, and that its statutory claims lack merit. After a hearing, the trial court 1. denied CCID’s request for injunctive relief and 2. granted the city’s plea to the jurisdiction. In two points of error, CCID contended the trial court erred in 1. overruling its due process claims by denying injunctive relief and 2. granting the city’s plea to the jurisdiction. HOLDING:Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The court found that CCID lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief. The court stated it could not ascertain any cognizable property interest that might be impacted by the city other than an unconstitutional taking of property prohibited by Article I, �17 of the Texas Constitution. CCID, however, consistently denied that its claim is a takings claim. Therefore, the court found that CCID failed to show any particular injury on which to sue. The court found that CCID lacked standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief because a claim must be a real controversy between the parties that will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought. Regarding the open records claim, the city argued CCID did not allege it had submitted a written request for information, that it lacks standing because CCID was not a “requestor” as defined by the act, or that the appropriate remedy is an action for mandamus. The failure to comply in all respects with statutory requirements may defeat a claimant’s right to relief but, again, it does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that it was error to dispose of CCID’s Open Meetings Act and Public Information Act claims in a plea to the jurisdiction. OPINION:Hudson, J.; Hudson, Fowler, and Seymore, J.J.

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