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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Phyllis Stallworth (wife) appeals from a final decree of divorce from Maurice Stallworth (husband). Husband and wife were married in 1980 and moved to Texas in 1983. Their three children, who were 13, 12 and 9 years old when the divorce was granted, were born in Texas. In 1996, husband moved out of the home, but continued to reside in Texas and later moved to Kaufman County. In March 1999, wife moved to New York with the three children and later moved again to Florida in August of 2000. Husband filed a petition for divorce on Nov. 27, 2000. Wife filed a special appearance, a plea to the jurisdiction, and a motion for rehearing as to jurisdiction, all of which the trial court heard and denied. Trial was to the court. The final divorce decree: 1. dissolved the marriage; 2. provided for joint conservatorship of the three children with wife as the managing conservator; and 3. awarded that portion of the marital estate in each party’s possession to that party, including each party’s respective retirement funds, benefits, and accounts. The decree recited that a court in the state of New York had entered a prior child support order setting forth husband’s obligation to support the children, and therefore the decree did not include an order concerning child support. Wife appealed. In January 2001, wife filed a special appearance contesting the trial court’s jurisdiction over her. The special appearance also requested the court to dismiss the action because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under ��152.201 and 152.203 of the Family Code. Alternatively, if the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, wife asked the trial court to decline to exercise that jurisdiction or stay any custody proceedings in favor of custody proceedings that she would institute in Florida. In March 2001, wife filed a motion for rehearing, noting the trial court had denied the special appearance when it issued its temporary orders in February 2001. (The trial court’s temporary orders are not in the clerk’s record.) The motion requested a rehearing “on the question of jurisdiction. . . .” Wife filed an amended motion for rehearing in May 2003, making the same request. That motion contains a notice that a hearing on the motion was set for July 7, 2003. On Feb. 24, 2004, the trial court signed an order denying wife’s “plea to the jurisdiction. . . .” The order specifically stated that “this Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the children, the subject of this suit, and has jurisdiction on all issues in controversy.” The order did not specify the date on which the court considered the issue. In her first issue, wife challenges the trial court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction in both the suit for dissolution of the marriage and the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. HOLDING:Affirmed. Because wife was served with process while present in the state, she was not denied due process under the U.S. Constitution. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610-19. Moreover, absent a reporter’s record, wife may not challenge the trial court’s implied findings in support of its ruling on jurisdiction. Husband testified he had been living in Kaufman County for at least the required 90-day period. In addition, there is evidence husband had lived in Texas since 1983 and was continuing to live there as of the day that the suit for divorce was filed, Nov. 27, 2000. There is also evidence that husband maintained a residence in Dallas County at the same time that he maintained a residence in Kaufman County. However, nothing prevents husband from maintaining a residence in both counties at the same time. McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied). Because there is evidence that husband met the statutory residency requirements to maintain a suit for divorce, the court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that husband met the requirements for bringing a divorce action. Wife contends because she did not receive the proper 45-day notice of trial as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition before the trial court should be dismissed for failure to provide adequate notice. Wife waived any error based on a lack of proper notice under Rule 245 by failing to object to that lack of notice. Wife claims that the trial court should not have ordered mediation between the parties and that she should not have been assessed a penalty for refusing to attend the scheduled mediation. Wife provides no specific arguments or authority for her position. She has therefore waived this argument. Wife further argues that the trial court erred by awarding joint conservatorship to the parties. Nothing in the record shows any undisputed evidence of family violence on the part of either party. In addition, nothing indicates that the trial court did not take the testimony into account when making its decision on the issue of child custody. The court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing joint managing conservators. Wife argues that the language of the final divorce decree concerning the division of all retirement proceeds is contrary to what the judge ordered orally during the final divorce trial. Specifically, the final divorce decree states that each party shall keep its own retirement proceeds, whereas the judge orally ordered that the retirement proceeds should be split “50/50″ during the divorce trial. She therefore contends that the final divorce decree should be modified to reflect the oral order given by the trial court. The record shows that the trial court orally announced its decision on Sept. 24, 2004, in open court. This oral pronouncement is a rendition of the judgment of the court, although no final judgment was signed at that time. As a result, the trial court maintained plenary power over that judgment for a period of 30 days after it was signed to modify it. Because wife did not file a motion for new trial, she waived any error. Moreover, the difference between the trial court’s statement from the bench and its final divorce decree should actually be considered a modification that was well within the plenary power of the trial court at the time. OPINION:Moseley, J.; Wright, Moseley and Lang, JJ.

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