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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Chris Ward appeals from the dismissal of his suit against Robert G. Parham, M.D., George R. Hunter, M.D., and Urology Associates. The order dismissing the cause, with prejudice, was signed by the trial court Dec. 6, 2005. On March 22, 2006, Ward filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to corrct a clerical mistake in the dismissal: that he did not intend to dismiss all parties, but only one of the defendants. On April 3, Ward filed a motion referencing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a, subd. 4 in which he asked the court to modify the order dated Dec. 6, 2005. The trial court denied both motions in separate orders, both dated June 20, 2006. Ward filed a notice of appeal specifically stating that it was from the June 20 order denying his motion pursuant to Rule 306a, subd. 4. HOLDING:Dismissed. Rule 306a, subd. 4 provides a method to create a new beginning point for calculating appellate timetables in situations where, at some point between twenty and ninety days after the judgment is signed, a party who has not received notice obtains actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment. When a party obtains actual knowledge within 90 days, and so proves to the trial court, the appellate timetable begins on the date proven, and the party may file motions and an appeal under that timetable. If, however, the party does not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge of the judgment within 20 days of the date the judgment is signed, Rule 306a, subd. 4 provides that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal shall begin to run on the date the party actually acquires notice or actual knowledge of the judgment, but in no event can the 30-day period begin after more than90 days have passed since the judgment was signed. The order pursuant to Rule 306a, subd. 4 is not one that is separately appealable, the court states. It determines when an appeal from the underlying judgment is timely. If Ward’s notice of appeal is read on its face as written, it limits his appeal only to the order overruling his motion to restart the timetables pursuant to Rule 306a, subd. 4. If limited to that reading, no appeal is possible. Even assuming that Ward were to properly amend his notice of appeal to appeal from the judgment, a direct appeal is not possible, the court determines. The judgment was signed Dec. 6, 2005. Assuming that, as he pleads, he received actual notice March 3, 2006, his appellate timetable began to run on that date. Assuming that either his motion filed March 22, 2006, or his motion filed April 3, 2006, served as a motion for new trial and extended the appellate timetable, Ward had 90 days from March 3, 2006, in which to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. That time expired June 1, 2006. Further postulating that Ward might have filed a motion to extend time, the rules provide a 15-day window for such a late filing, which would extend the timetable only to June 16, 2006. The notice of appeal was filed July 19, 2006. It is untimely, even under the most lenient factual scenario, the court concludes. OPINION:Donald R. Ross, J.; Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

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