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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Bryan Parr, the real party in interest in this habeas petition, and D’Juana Parr, the petitioner, had a son in 1998, and divorced in Harris County on May 8, 2001. The trial court appointed Bryan and D’Juana joint managing conservators of their son and ordered D’Juana to pay child support of $126 per month, starting May 1, 2001, and continuing to be payable on the first day of each month thereafter until their son became 18, or other specified conditions, not relevant here, were fulfilled. D’Juana asserts that on March 3, 2005, she filed a petition for divorce in Montgomery County. The petition alleged that, after the signing of the Harris County divorce decree, “the parties remarried by entering into an informal marriage.” On April 11, 2005, D’Juana filed an amended petition for divorce, which does not mention the informal marriage. It alleged that on June 8, 2001, the parties entered into their second marriage and ceased to live together as husband and wife on Oct. 20, 2003. It alleged that J.M.P. “is not under the continuing jurisdiction of any other court” and “[t]here are no court-ordered conservatorships, court-ordered guardianships, or other court ordered relationships affecting the child the subject of this suit.” On June 7, 2005, counsel for Bryan faxed a letter to the Montgomery County district clerk advising that Brian and D’Juana had been divorced since May 3, 2001. On June 8, 2001, Brian filed a special appearance in the Montgomery County proceeding. On July 29, 2005, in the Harris County case, Brian filed his first amended motion for enforcement, asserting that D’Juana had not made the court ordered child support payments from May 1, 2001 to July 1, 2005. On Oct. 5, 2005, the trial court heard the motion, and, on Oct. 13, 2005, issued its order finding D’Juana in contempt for not making the $126 child support payments on five occasions from Nov. 1, 2003 through March 1, 2004. For each of the five violations of the 2001 decree, the trial court assessed D’Juana confinement in the Harris County jail for 90 days, to run concurrently. In the Oct. 13 order, the trial court conditionally suspended the commitment, provided that, among other things, D’Juana pay $100 per month against the $5,878.36 arrearage. The trial court also set a date in December 2005 as a hearing date to determine whether D’Juana had complied with the terms and conditions of the suspension of commitment and community supervision, on which the trial court had placed D’Juana. On Dec. 16, 2005, the trial court held the compliance hearing. D’Juana’s counsel asserted that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because of the divorce petition pending in Montgomery County. After a telephone conference with the Montgomery County judge, the trial court determined that it would go forward with the compliance hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order (the Dec. 16 order) finding that D’Juana had not complied with the terms and conditions of the suspension of commitment portion of the Oct. 13 order. In the Dec. 16 order, the trial court revoked the suspension of commitment and committed D’Juana to the Harris County jail for 90 days for each of the five violations of the 2001 divorce decree. Additionally, the trial court provided that D’Juana should be confined from “day to day until . . . D’Juana Parr has: (1) (2) (3).” D’Juana was placed in jail. HOLDING:Denied. The court in Harris County had jurisdiction of the subject matter under the general laws; Texas Constitution, article 5, �8; Texas Government Code, �24.007 (Vernon 2004); and Texas Government Code, �24.424 (Vernon 2004). It acquired jurisdiction over D’Juana’s person when she was served with a copy of the motion for contempt. Thus, at the time the Harris County court issued the contempt order, its jurisdiction was fully activated. It is well-established that habeas corpus will lie only to review jurisdictional defects or denial of fundamental constitutional rights. Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A judgment and sentence may be collaterally attacked only where they are void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Here, the trial court had jurisdiction. D’Juana may not collaterally attack her contempt sentence on the basis that venue was improper. D’Juana contends that the language, “day to day” in the Dec. 16 order adds to the 90 concurrent days of punishment ordered in the Oct. 13 order and fails to provide contempt purging provisions in violation of her due process rights. Such a provision is a failed attempt by the trial court to add a coercive form of confinement to the already prescribed 90 days of punitive concurrent confinement. D’Juana’s attack on this attempted coercive confinement provision is premature because she has not yet served the 90 days of punitive confinement. OPINION:Higley, J.; Jennings, Hanks and Higley, J.J.

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