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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On Nov. 12, 1991, Harold Melton Willett signed a will containing the following provision: “This Will is made in consideration of the making of a mutual Will by my wife, VIOLET ADELIA WILLETT, executed on the same date as this Will.” After Harold died on Sept. 7, 1999, Violet probated and took under his will. Less than one month after probating Harold’s will, Violet signed a will leaving her entire estate to her daughter Shirley Lee Craig. After Violet died on Aug. 14, 2001, Craig had Violet’s 1999 will probated and took under the terms of that will. The other beneficiaries under Harold’s will � appellees Paula Kay Swinburn, Karrie Kristina Horn, Katrina Denise Reeves, Terry Melton Willett, and Bonnie Marie Smallwood � later sued Craig, individually and as Violet’s attorney-in-fact, claiming breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, forfeiture of inheritance, conspiracy and conversion, and sought a declaratory judgment, an accounting, a constructive trust, and actual and exemplary damages. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied Craig’s motion in its entirety and granted the appellees’ motion in part. After Craig filed her notice of appeal seeking to appeal this order, the appellees moved to dismiss, arguing the trial court’s partial summary judgment is not an appealable order. HOLDING:The court dismisses this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. To determine whether an order is “final” under Texas Probate Code �5(g) and therefore appealable, the supreme court has promulgated the following test: “If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.” Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995). The only proceeding of which the trial court’s partial summary judgment may logically be considered a part is the appellees’ suit. There is not an express statute declaring a trial court’s partial summary judgment order in a lawsuit to be final and appealable. The appellees’ petition raises issues not disposed of by the trial court’s order. By its very terms, the partial summary judgment order does not dispose of the issue of whether Craig is entitled to possession of her one-fourth interest in Harold’s estate; rather, the order expressly provides that this interest “shall remain in suspense pending trial in this cause.” The partial summary judgment order also does not dispose of the appellees’ remaining causes of action; the order expressly orders these causes of action set for trial. Nor is there an order severing the trial court’s partial summary judgment, as there was in Crowson. Under the Crowson test, the trial court’s partial summary judgment order is not an appealable order, the court holds. OPINION:Duncan, J.; Duncan, Angelini and Speedlin, J.J.

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