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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In May of 2004, Jangwoo and Hyangran Whi sued Jose Dahul Breceda and Maria de Jesus Reyes alleging violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and breach of contract arising out of a commercial lease. On Oct. 26, 2004, the parties engaged in mediation as instructed by the trial court. The parties reached a settlement, and the agreement was written and signed by the parties. Robert G. Gilbert, the Whis’ attorney, contacted Ray Gutierrez, Breceda’s and Reyes’s attorney, who told him to refrain from preparing any documents or taking any action to fulfill the terms of the mediated settlement agreement, because Breceda was repudiating the agreement. On Nov. 17, 2004, the Whis filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that they were entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law based on the mediated settlement agreement reached on Oct. 26, 2004. Attached to the motion for summary judgment was an affidavit of Gilbert.Gilbert indicated that Gutierrez had served as a translator for Reyes. He also stated that the mediator had asked both parties if they were fully capable of binding their respective parties to the terms of a mediated settlement agreement and both Whi and Breceda stated that they were. The Rules for Mediation also contained the signatures of all parties present as a manifestation of their understanding and acceptance of the Rules. On Dec. 15, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment filed by the appellees. The trial court granted the summary judgment and entered a final judgment. Thereafter, appellants filed their notice of appeal. HOLDING:Affirmed. The thrust of appellants’ argument invalidating the settlement agreement focuses on the fact that Breceda did not provide Reyes with either power of attorney or designate her as his agent. However, the settlement agreement not only reflects the signature of Reyes, but more importantly, it also contains the signature of Gutierrez, appellants’ counsel. The focus is thus misplaced. Whether Reyes was designated as Breceda’s agent or had power of attorney to sign on behalf of Breceda is irrelevant in this case. The summary judgment evidence shows no indication that appellants were in any way forced or misled into the agreement. Ordinary care dictates that appellants and their attorney discuss all the implications of their decision. Without any indication that appellants’ counsel acted outside the scope of his authority as their attorney, Gutierrez is presumed to have been acting within his authority. The summary judgment evidence does not rebut the presumption that Gutierrez’s actions were under the direction of Breceda. Appellants claim that a certified translator was not provided during the mediation and in so doing, imply Reyes did not understand what she was agreeing to. However, this line of argument does not excuse Breceda from being bound by the agreement. Additionally, appellants contend that the agreement was not valid because not all the parties were present. The court notes that 1. appellants’ counsel was present at the mediation, and 2. the record shows that Gutierrez was translating the conversations and all pertinent documents throughout the mediation. There is no indication that Reyes requested a certified translator or did not understand what was going on. Appellants also assert the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against them, because the Rule 11 requirements were not met. Appellants fail to specifically point to which Rule 11 requirements were not met. An agreement involving pending litigation may comply with Rule 11 in either of two ways: 1. be in writing, signed, and filed with the papers as part of the court’s record or 2. be made in open court and entered of record. These two provisions allow the agreement to be put into written form and kept with the court’s records so that the parties to the suit cannot dispute its existence or contents. Kosowska v. Khan, 929 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Rule 11 does not require the writing to be filed before consent is withdrawn by one of the parties, but merely requires the agreement be filed before anyone seeks to enforce it. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1995). A settlement agreement attached as an exhibit to a motion for summary judgment sufficiently complies with the filing with the papers as part of the court’s record requirement. The summary judgment evidence brought forth by the appellees indicates that the settlement agreement was in writing, signed and was filed when it was attached to the summary judgment evidence as an exhibit. The agreement complied with Rule 11 requirements. Appellants have failed to bring forth any evidence in the contrary. The court holds that as a matter of law, the settlement agreement met the Rule 11 requirements and was a valid agreement. OPINION:Barajas, CJ; Barajas, CJ, McClure and Chew, JJ.

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