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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Allen Fitzgerald Calton was arrested and charged with evading arrest. The indictment alleged that he fled, using a vehicle, from a peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. The second paragraph alleged that, before the commission of that offense, Calton had been convicted of evading arrest. Two more paragraphs set out additional prior convictions as “habitual offender” notices. Calton pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury. The state did not introduce any evidence of the prior evading arrest conviction or the other two prior convictions at the guilt phase of trial. The jury charge asked the jury to find whether Calton “did intentionally flee, using a vehicle, from . . . a peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him.” It did not ask the jury to find whether Calton had been previously convicted of evading arrest. Based on this charge, the jury found Calton “guilty as alleged in the indictment.” At the punishment phase, paragraph two of the indictment and both habitual offender notices were read. The jury checked “true” to the “enhancement paragraph” and to both “habitual offender notices.” The jury assessed punishment at 50 years in prison. Calton appealed. He argued, among other things, that his 50-year sentence was illegal because the state failed to prove an essential element of the offense specifically, the prior evading arrest conviction. As a result, he contended, he had been convicted only of a state jail felony which, with enhancements, had a maximum sentence of 20 years. The court of appeals agreed. The court concluded that a prior evading arrest conviction is an element of the offense of third-degree evading arrest and must be proved at the guilt phase of trial. The court reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for a state jail felony and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing. This court granted the state’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether a prior conviction for evading arrest must be proved at the guilt stage of trial in a prosecution for third-degree felony evading arrest. HOLDING:Affirmed. The issue in this case is whether the prior conviction must be proved at guilt-innocence or punishment. To sustain a conviction, all the elements of the offense must be proved at guilt. So the relevant question is whether the prior conviction is an element of the offense, not whether it is jurisdictional. Whether something is an element of an offense is a completely separate inquiry from whether it is jurisdictionally required. Jurisdiction is not an element of an offense. The state contends that this result violates Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.01. That statute provides that “[w]hen prior convictions are alleged for purposes of enhancement only and are not jurisdictional, that portion of the indictment or information reciting such convictions shall not be read until the hearing on punishment is held as provided in Article 37.07.” The state contends that this statute restricts proof of nonjurisdictional prior convictions to the punishment phase. For support, the state relies on Bell v. State, 504 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The language in Bell implies that a prior conviction alleged for enhancement purposes may be jurisdictional or not, and if it is jurisdictional, it must be proved at the guilt phase of trial. But this implication is imprecise, the court states. In fact, a prior conviction must be proved at the guilt stage of trial if it is an element of the offense, whether or not it is jurisdictional. If it is alleged for enhancement purposes, it is not an element of the offense. The focus of the inquiry is on whether the prior conviction is an element of the offense, not on whether it is jurisdictional. The court of appeals correctly held that the prior conviction in this case was an element of the offense and had to be proved at the guilt phase of trial. OPINION:Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Meyers, Price, Johnson, and Hervey, JJ., joined. Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., Holcomb, and Cochran, J.J., joined. DISSENT:Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Keller, P.J., Holcomb and Cochran, JJ., joined. “I believe that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the allegation of the prior offense was an element of the offense, and I am sure that it was not alleged for jurisdiction. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm that of the Criminal District Court.”

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