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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A jury convicted appellant of sexual assault and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the court of appeals held that evidence of the extraneous sexual assault became relevant after appellant raised the defense that the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse because it logically served to make less probable the defensive evidence that the complainant was a willing participant in the sexual act to which she testified. It also held that the evidence was admissible “for a purpose other than to show [appellant]‘s character as a sexual predator” and “its probative value in rebutting [appellant]‘s defensive theory of consent was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice[.]“ The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence. HOLDING:Affirmed. In Owens v. State, 827 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), the court stated that “[e]vidence of a defendant’s particular modus operandi is a recognized exception to the general rule precluding extraneous offense evidence, if the modus operandi evidence tends to prove a material fact at issue, other than propensity.” The court explained the term modus operandi in the context of extraneous offenses, stating that the term refers to “a defendant’s distinctive and idiosyncratic manner of committing criminal acts.” The similarities between the charged offense and the extraneous offense in that case were not so unusual or idiosyncratic as to signal conclusively that they were the handiwork of the same person. Here, the appellant admitted that he falsely claimed to be a law enforcement officer as a ruse to “pick up” both the complainant and the extraneous-offense witness, and both women testified that they agreed to meet appellant in a residential area, that the meeting was the first face-to-face meeting after initial contact, and that they were sexually assaulted by appellant in a residence. The court concludes that the facts of the instant case, unlike those in Owens, show a modus operandi sufficiently distinctive to qualify as an exception to the general rule precluding the admission of extraneous-offense evidence. Addressing appellant’s specific questions for review, whether articulated under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) standards or the doctrine of chances, the court concludes that under the facts and circumstances of this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extraneous offense evidence and that the admission of the evidence did not violate Rule 404(b). OPINION:Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Keller, P.J., and Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, and Cochran, JJ. Meyers, J., not participating.

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