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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The court substitutes this opinion for its June 22, 2005, opinion, which is withdrawn on the court’s own motion for rehearing. The applicant was serving an eight-year sentence for a mandatory supervision eligible offense in cause No. 0243176D with a calculated start date of April 30, 1984, when he was sentenced to 15 years in cause No. 8565 for an offense that was not mandatory-supervision eligible. This 15-year sentence was ordered to begin when the eight-year sentence in cause No. 0243176D ceased to operate. The applicant contends that the eight-year sentence in cause No. 0243176D ceased to operate on Dec. 18, 1990, when he would have been automatically released to mandatory supervision had he not committed the offense in cause No. 8565. HOLDING:Habeas corpus relief is denied. This court in Ex Parte Ruthart, 980 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) rejected the claim that mandatory supervision is an event which causes an inmate’s first sentence to cease to operate. This rested in large part on Ruthart’s definition of maximum term in former Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.18 8(c), most of which was re-enacted in Texas Government Code 508.147(a). The habeas court’s findings state that “reasonable minds could conclude that Ruthart was wrongly decided” because Ruthart placed considerable stock in the phrase “maximum term” in former Article 42.18 8(c), without noticing that the term “maximum” was not included in the statute when it was reenacted in the Government Code in 508.147(a). But, Ruthart was applying and interpreting former Article 42.18 8(c), which contained the term “maximum” and which is the law applicable to this case, the court states. If “term” for 508.147(a) purposes applied to the first sentence in a series of sentences, it would be possible, as stated in Kuester, for an inmate to “spend 20 or 30 years on [mandatory supervision], living and working in the community, a rehabilitated and contributing member of society. When at last his [mandatory supervision] is complete and his sentence discharges, he must then be returned to prison to begin serving his second sentence.” Ex Parte Kuester, 21 S.W.3d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). The court declines to adopt this construction. A sentence ceases to operate when it is served out fully, day for day, or on the date a parole panel designates as the date an inmate would have been eligible for release on parole if the inmate had been sentenced to serve a single sentence, the court holds, adhering to its prior decisions. OPINION:Hervey, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion.

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