X

Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.
Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant, Lizeth Hernandez, filed suit against the appellee, Arturo N. De La Rosa, for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision. The appellant was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by the appellee’s son, David De La Rosa. The appellee was divorced from David’s mother, Rosa Elena De La Rosa, and David resided with his mother. The appellant’s original petition attempted to impute the negligence of David to his father under the theory that the appellee was the owner and insured driver listed on the vehicle that David De La Rosa was driving at the time of the collision. The appellee filed two motions for summary judgment on traditional grounds and as a “no-evidence” motion. The trial court granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment without specifying the grounds. The appellant sought review of the trial court’s judgment. HOLDING:Affirmed. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the evidence presented was more than a scintilla of evidence to support her theory that the appellee was the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision. In her response to the motion for summary judgment, the appellant attached a copy of an insurance policy maintained by the appellee, which listed the vehicle that had been driven by his son as an insured vehicle under a policy issued to the appellee. The appellant contends that this is sufficient to establish ownership of the vehicle in question. She also attached a copy of the divorce decree between the De La Rosas arguing that the divorce decree did not dispose of the vehicle and, therefore, is the property of both ex-spouses, creating an issue regarding ownership. The court disagrees and finds that the decree clearly awards a motor vehicle to Rosa De La Rosa. Though the language of the decree describes the motor vehicle in general terms, the court holds that the undisputed affidavits filed in the appellee’s motion for summary judgment support the implied finding of the trial court that the vehicle involved in the collision was awarded to Rosa De La Rosa as her property and therefore, that the appellee did not own the car at the time of the accident. The appellant’s response is essentially a pronouncement that the insurance listing alone establishes that there are genuine issues of material fact and, therefore, the appellee’s motion for summary judgment should be denied. The court concludes that, in fact, a review of the summary judgment evidence establishes that the evidence provided is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. OPINION:Barajas, C.J.; Barajas, C.J., Wright and McCall, JJ.

Want to continue reading?
Become a Free ALM Digital Reader.

Benefits of a Digital Membership:

  • Free access to 3 articles* every 30 days
  • Access to the entire ALM network of websites
  • Unlimited access to the ALM suite of newsletters
  • Build custom alerts on any search topic of your choosing
  • Search by a wide range of topics

*May exclude premium content
Already have an account?

 
 

ALM Legal Publication Newsletters

Sign Up Today and Never Miss Another Story.

As part of your digital membership, you can sign up for an unlimited number of a wide range of complimentary newsletters. Visit your My Account page to make your selections. Get the timely legal news and critical analysis you cannot afford to miss. Tailored just for you. In your inbox. Every day.

Copyright © 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All Rights Reserved.