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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:After petitioning for divorce but before expiration of the mandatory 60-day waiting period, Edna Sue Anderson Woods and her husband, Danny Craig Woods, agreed to a particular division of their marital estate. The agreement was transcribed into the record at a hearing conducted by the trial court on Nov. 21, 2002, a date some five weeks before expiration of the waiting period. And, though all recognized that a final judgment could not be entered upon the agreement at the time of the hearing, each acceded to the execution of temporary orders incorporating it. Then, the trial court not only approved the accord but also informed the litigants that their bargain would be incorporated into a final judgment when the prescribed waiting period lapsed. After the temporary orders were executed but before the trial court signed a written judgment, Edna moved to withdraw her consent to the agreement. A hearing was held on the motion, after which it was denied. Subsequently, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce. Therein, it stated that the parties previously had “entered into an Agreement Incident to Divorce . . .,” that the trial court had approved the agreement, and that the property division reflected in the document was “in accordance with the agreement.” HOLDING:The court reverses that portion of the judgment that divides the marital estate of Edna and Danny Woods, affirms the remainder of the decree, and remands the cause for further proceedings. The record clearly illustrates that Edna withdrew her consent to the Nov. 21, 2002 agreement before the trial court signed the final decree. Yet, Danny argues that this is unimportant since the trial court actually rendered judgment during the Nov. 21 hearing. The trial court’s comments following the hearing contain words short of evincing a clear intent to finally adjudicate the rights involved. The trial court recognized that it could not resolve some issues at that time. Thus, it decided to issue “temporary orders” memorializing the agreement “during the pendency of the divorce.” And, once the requisite 60-day period lapsed, the parties were to then “submit a final decree . . . that has the property division . . .”, which decree the trial court would sign to finalize the divorce. Explicit in these words was the need for further action, though the trial court revealed the nature of the decision that would be encompassed by that action. And, the action consisted of the execution of a written decree containing the parties’ agreement. Because of that, the court cannot say that the trial court rendered judgment at the Nov. 21 hearing. The trial court erred by incorporating into its judgment an agreement which Edna had previously revoked, the court holds. OPINION:Quinn, C.J.; Quinn, C.J., and Reavis and Campbell, JJ.

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