Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.
Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated by misdemeanor information. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, claiming that 1. the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for DWI; and 2. the stop was prohibited by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03. After a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress. The appellant pleaded guilty to the offense but appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. HOLDING:The court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals. The appellant’s erratic driving was reported by a citizen who called “911″ on her cell phone after she witnessed appellant speeding, tailgating, and weaving across several lanes of traffic. The citizen, who continued to monitor the appellant’s driving by following appellant in her car, kept in contact with the “911″ dispatcher until the arresting officer stopped the appellant. The citizen testified at the suppression hearing that the dispatcher instructed her to follow appellant and activate her hazard lights so that the responding officer would be able to identify the correct vehicle. The citizen remained at the scene after the stop, and she provided the officer with her contact information. The court of appeals concluded that, although the officer did not witness the erratic driving, the detailed information he received from the “911″ dispatcher was sufficient to warrant the traffic stop. The appellant’s argument that an officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity, is against the great weight of authority and unsound, according to the court. The court holds that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant was stopped outside the arresting officer’s jurisdiction based on the officer’s probable cause that DWI was underway, and the officer so testified. The officer was resolute that the caller had provided facts which led him to believe that DWI � not traffic offenses � was afoot. Therefore, Article 14.03(g) did not prohibit the stop outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Article 14.03(d) further authorized the stop. Subsection (d) provides that an officer may make an extra-jurisdictional stop for felony offenses, disorderly conduct offenses under Chapter 42, intoxication offenses under Chapter 49, and breaches of the peace that are committed within the officer’s view. OPINION:Holcomb, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Price, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Womack, J., joined as to part III.

Want to continue reading?
Become a Free ALM Digital Reader.

Benefits of a Digital Membership:

  • Free access to 3 articles* every 30 days
  • Access to the entire ALM network of websites
  • Unlimited access to the ALM suite of newsletters
  • Build custom alerts on any search topic of your choosing
  • Search by a wide range of topics

*May exclude premium content
Already have an account?


ALM Legal Publication Newsletters

Sign Up Today and Never Miss Another Story.

As part of your digital membership, you can sign up for an unlimited number of a wide range of complimentary newsletters. Visit your My Account page to make your selections. Get the timely legal news and critical analysis you cannot afford to miss. Tailored just for you. In your inbox. Every day.

Copyright © 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All Rights Reserved.