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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:After sending an individual (Tellez) a notice that his property was non-conforming, the city of Socorro’s zoning board held a hearing on June 27, 2002, on the matter and denied Tellez’s request to declare his property legal non-conforming. On July 3, Tellez filed a petition for writ of certiorari and declaratory relief from the board’s decision. Tellez named only the city as a defendant, and the city filed a general denial. The trial court affirmed the board decision. HOLDING:Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court notes that judicial review of a zoning board’s decision is governed by Local Government Code 211.011. As required by statute, Tellez filed a petition appealing the board’s decision within ten days. Though neither the statute nor a relevant city ordinance explicitly requires it, Tellez did not name the zoning board as a defendant, only the city, the court explains. Further, Tellez did not describe the illegality of any decision made by the board. Relying on Pearce v. City of Round Rock, 992 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.App. Austin 1999, pet. denied), the court finds that while naming one or some of the representatives of an entity may not be equivalent to naming the entity itself, naming all of the members of an entity, in their official capacities, is sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, however, Tellez only sued the city, not the zoning board, and did not include any of the members of the zoning board by name. The failure to do so deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the matter, and therefore, this court is without jurisdiction, too. The court notes that despite the faulty process Tellez used, the parties engaged in paper discovery and had a non-jury trial. Though the trial court applied the correct standard in that proceeding. And while the Local Government Code provides that the trial court may conduct an evidentiary hearing or take evidence, the process to be followed is governed by the statute. “Appellate review of this quasi-administrative appeal is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in its limited review of the legality of the board’s decision. . . . Because . . . there is not subject matter jurisdiction with the trial court, we sua sponte dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and further hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a decision in the case below. Where the trial court does not have jurisdiction to render a judgment, the proper practice is for the reviewing court to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause.” OPINION:Barajas, C.J.; Barajas, C.J., McClure and Ables, JJ.

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