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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Mauro Vargas filed this workplace injury suit against the Stone Container Corp. and Paul Pinon. Vargas was employed by D.M. Dickason Personnel Services and was on assignment at Stone Container on the day he was injured. Vargas filed a claim for workers compensation against Dickason, and the claim was accepted. Vargas then filed suit against Stone Container and Pinon in Texas state court, asserting state law claims of negligence. Stone Container and Pinon removed the case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction, in spite of the fact that Pinon and Vargas are both citizens of Texas. Vargas responded by filing a motion to remand the case, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because Pinon’s Texas residency destroyed diversity and the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000. Stone Container and Pinon countered by arguing that the value of Vargas’s injury did exceed the statutory minimum, and that Vargas, knowing that he did not have a state law cause of action against Pinon as an individual employee, improperly joined Pinon to destroy diversity. While the motion to remand was pending, Stone Container and Pinon filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because Vargas was working as a borrowed servant, they were shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA. The district court eventually denied Vargas’ motion to remand, finding that Vargas had no state law cause of action against Pinon and had improperly joined Pinon to destroy diversity. The district court then granted Stone Container and Pinon’s motion for summary judgment in favor of Stone Container and Pinon. Vargas then filed a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court erred in holding that Pinon was improperly joined. The district court reconsidered and granted Vargas’s motion, but only as to Pinon. The district court found that Vargas might have state law negligence claims against Pinon as an individual employee, and that Pinon had not been improperly joined. The district court then reasoned that, due to the previous summary judgment in favor of Stone Container and the fact that the district court no longer had original jurisdiction over the case, the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims against Pinon. The district court then remanded Vargas’s state law negligence claims against Pinon to Texas state court. HOLDING:Pinon’s appeal is dismissed. The district court’s summary judgment in favor of Stone Container and Pinon are vacated. The case is remanded to the district court. Acting under the assumption that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the district court granted Stone Container and Pinon’s motion for summary judgment. Vargas’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s grant of summary judgment and holding that Pinon was improperly joined was also a challenge to the district court’s original jurisdiction to enter such a judgment. When the district court reconsidered and found that Pinon was not improperly joined, the district court’s diversity jurisdiction was destroyed, and its judgment in favor of Stone Container and Pinon should have been vacated. If a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction both at the time of removal and at the time it enters a judgment, the judgment cannot stand. The consequence of the district court’s lack of jurisdiction is that the judgment in favor of Stone Container and Pinon must be vacated and the entire suit remanded to state court. A remand order on the ground that the district court lacks jurisdiction cannot be reviewed on appeal or otherwise. Pinon argues, however, that the order to remand was issued after a final judgment and is thus subject to review by this court. 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) bars only review of remand orders issues under 1477(c). Section 1447(c) provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Thus, a remand order issued after entry of final judgment does not fall within the prohibition of 1447(c). In this case, the district court had not finally disposed of the claim against one party, Pinon, until the motion for reconsideration was decided. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction both at the time of the removal and at the time it entered final judgment. The remand order was entered prior to a valid final judgment, and thus, cannot be reviewed by this court. OPINION:Per curiam; Reavley, Jones and Garza, JJ.

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