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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Section 21.051 of the Labor Code provides that “[a]n employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer: (1) fails or refuses to hire an individual. . . .” For purposes of Chapter 21, the term “disability” means “with respect to an individual, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity of that individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. . . .” 21.002(6). The question in this case is whether the plaintiff-petitioner, whose left leg has been amputated at the knee, produced legally sufficient evidence that, at the time of the adverse employment actions of which she complains, she had a disability. The issue is whether there is any probative summary judgment evidence that Evelyn Little, who wears a prosthesis on her left leg and walks with a noticeable limp, had at that time a “physical impairment that substantially limit[ed] at least one major life activity.” The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Little had “failed to make a threshold showing that she has a disability.” HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. Citing changes in the law, the court decides that it will no longer refer to Ch. 21 of the Labor Code as the Commission on Human Rights Act. One express purpose of Ch. 21 of the Labor Code is to “provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its subsequent amendments (42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.).” 21.001(3). The Legislature in 1993 fully incorporated the ADA definition of the term “disability” into Ch. 21. Both the federal court decisions interpreting the ADA and the federal administrative regulations regarding the ADA guide this court’s interpretation of the definition of “disability” contained in Ch. 21. A person need not be totally unable to walk to be “disab[led]” under 12102(2)(A) of the ADA; she need only be significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration of her walking as compared to that of the average person in the general population. Viewed in the light most favorable to Little, the summary judgment record reflects that, at the time of the adverse employment actions of which she complains, she was significantly restricted as to the manner in which she could walk compared to the manner in which the average person in the general population could walk. Therefore, the court concludes that there is probative summary judgment evidence that, at the time of the adverse employment actions of which she complains, Little had a “physical impairment that substantially limit[ed] at least one major life activity.” 21.002(6). Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in affirming the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s summary judgment on that ground. OPINION:Smith, J.

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