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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The Commission for Lawyer Discipline brought a disciplinary action against Rowena Jenkins Daniels. Following a jury trial, the court disbarred Daniels from the practice of law. Daniels contends the trial court erred in 1. waiving the complainant’s presence at trial; and 2. excluding evidence of a nunc pro tunc judgment. HOLDING:Affirmed. The plain meaning of Texas Government Code �81.072 authorizes the complainant’s presence at trial; it does not require it. The statute requires notice to the complainant, but merely authorizes the complainant’s presence. In addition, the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure established by the Texas Supreme Court do not require the presence of the complainant at any of the hearings or trials provided for under those rules. The Commission argues that admission of the nunc pro tunc judgment would have confused the jury and permitted Daniels to argue that the nunc pro tunc judgment eliminated the original judgment. The court believes, however, that excluding the nunc pro tunc judgment created the greater likelihood of confusing the jury. The original judgment admitted into evidence contained the conflict in the number of days of Daniels’ suspension, which the nunc pro tunc judgment corrected. Admission of the original judgment, with the docket sheet reflecting that a nunc pro tunc judgment had been entered, but without the jury being able to see that nunc pro tunc judgment, presented an incomplete picture and was more calculated to cause confusion than if the nunc pro tunc judgment had been admitted. The nunc pro tunc judgment explained and corrected the conflict in the original judgment. Had the nunc pro tunc judgment been admitted, any attempt by Daniels to then incorrectly argue the effect of the nunc pro tunc judgment could have been prevented by a proper objection or by an additional instruction from the court. The court holds that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the nunc pro tunc judgment. A review of the entire record reveals that the error in excluding the nunc pro tunc judgment was harmless. Daniels contended to the jury that she relied on the “thirty days” language in the judgment and believed that she was permitted to practice law on April 4, 2001, which was 31 days after March 5, 2001. She contends that, when the court excluded the nunc pro tunc judgment, she was then prevented from arguing to the jury that the judge was also mistaken about the period of active suspension. The evidence at trial showed, however, that Daniels practiced law on April 3, 2001, the 30th day of her suspension, which was prohibited by any reading of either judgment. The sufficiency of that evidence is not challenged. Daniels therefore did not show that the exclusion of the nunc pro tunc judgment probably resulted in an improper judgment. OPINION:Donald R. Ross, J.; Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

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