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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:This court granted B. J. Franklin’s petition for discretionary review, which claimed along with three other grounds for review that the information juror Spradlin withheld (that she knew the victim) was material and that he had preserved the issue for review. The court concluded that Franklin had preserved error and that the information withheld by Spradlin was material. The court remanded the cause to the court of appeals to conduct a harm analysis. On remand, the court of appeals reversed Franklin’s conviction. It determined that the error was of a constitutional dimension subject to harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). This court then granted the state’s petition for discretionary review, which contends that the court of appeals erred in analyzing the improper limitation of defense questioning for harm under Rule 44.2(a). The state also argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that the improper limitation of defense counsel questioning in this case was harmful where the record does not show that the jury was not fair and impartial. HOLDING:Affirmed. All of the factors together � juror Spradlin’s failure to reveal her relationship to the victim, the judge’s denial of a mistrial, and the trial judge’s refusal to allow defense counsel to question Spradlin about her relationship to the victim � affected Franklin’s right to a trial by an impartial jury. So, the court concludes that the court of appeals properly applied the constitutional standard of harm under Rule 44.2(a). Because the court concludes that the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial after Spradlin revealed that she withheld material information is constitutional error, the court does not address whether the error implicated Franklin’s right to counsel. The court agrees with the court of appeals that the proper standard is the constitutional standard, but for a different reason. The court of appeals did not have to find that the jury was not fair and impartial. Instead, the court of appeals was required to reverse the conviction unless it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s denial of a mistrial after juror Spradlin revealed that she knew the victim did not contribute to Franklin’s conviction or punishment. The court of appeals in this case found that because the trial court “refused to admit the information that would have permitted [it] to apply a harm analysis to the juror’s failure to answer counsel’s voir dire questions accurately,” there was an “absence of evidence that would allow [it] to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction.” The court of appeals properly applied the standard of harm in this case. OPINION:Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Price, Johnson, Hervey, and Holcomb, JJ., joined. Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cochran, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Meyers, J., joined. Womack, J., concurred without opinion. DISSENT:Keller, P.J.; “The Court characterizes the issue as”what standard of harm should be applied to the trial judge’s denial of a mistrial’ based on the juror’s withholding of material information. But as we recently explained in Hawkins v. State, the question is not whether the defendant was harmed by the court’s denial of a mistrial, but whether the trial court erred in the first place by refusing to grant a mistrial. The harm analysis is built into the determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial. The Court’s harm analysis is, therefore, directly at odds with our recent holding in Hawkins.” DISSENT:Cochran, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Meyers, J., joined. “I would . . . follow federal precedent and abate this case to the trial court to give appellant the opportunity to call Ms. Spradlin and question her about her relationship with C.N.T. If Ms. Spradlin was actually biased against appellant, he has suffered constitutional harm. If she was not biased, appellant was tried by a fair and impartial jury and he has suffered no harm at all, despite the trial court’s error.”

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