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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Appellant, Rodney Swearingen, was convicted and sentenced to eighteen years’ confinement for the felony offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety Code � 481.102(6) & 481.112(a), (d). He appealed the trial court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, which alleged that the drugs found in the search of the residence were the fruits of an illegal search, undertaken pursuant to a search warrant unsupported by probable cause. Appellant argued that the information in the warrant affidavit was stale. The Third Court of Appeals, applying a deferential standard of review, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. HOLDING:Affirmed. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), merely articulated a general principle for determining when an issue should be reviewed de novo and when it should be reviewed deferentially. The standard to be applied to the review of a magistrate’s determination of probable cause in issuing a search warrant is an exception to the general rule set out in Guzman. It is an exception mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The court recognizes the distinction between the standards of review applicable to warrantless searches and searches pursuant to a warrant and reaffirm that a magistrate’s determination to issue a warrant is subject to the deferential standard of review articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The court of appeals stated and applied the standard of review set forth in Johnson. Although the court is not reviewing the correctness of the court of appeals’ ultimate conclusion, the court can tell by the court of appeal’s language that it did apply the correct standard in reaching that conclusion. The court of appeals found that the absence of facts from which a quantity of drugs could be inferred was not fatal to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause because, considering the affidavit as a whole and the reasonable inferences it supports, a substantial basis existed to support a finding of probable cause. The court of appeals reasoned that, although the magistrate may not have been able to rule out the possibility that the methamphetamine had already been consumed or moved, the magistrate was not foreclosed from concluding that it was reasonably likely that a search of the house would uncover evidence tending to show that appellant was guilty of possession of methamphetamine. OPINION:Holcomb, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., Womack, Keasler, and Hervey, JJ., joined. Cochran, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Meyers, Price, and Johnson, JJ., joined.

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