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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:This is a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus before this court pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. In 1990, the applicant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine, was convicted, and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. He was sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Special Alternative Incarceration Program (Boot Camp). By May 6, 1991, the applicant had successfully completed boot camp, the trial court suspended his sentence, and placed the applicant on probation for the remainder of his term. On July 19, 1991, the state filed a motion to revoke probation alleging that the applicant had violated the conditions of his probation. On Feb. 14, 1992, the applicant was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. On the same day, the trial court revoked the applicant’s probation and imposed a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. The trial court included a cumulation order in the judgment revoking probation whereby the 10-year sentence for possession of cocaine was stacked on the 60-year murder sentence. The applicant seeks relief; he alleges that the stacking order was improper because he had already begun his sentence by attending boot camp. HOLDING:Denied. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.08 gives the trial court the discretion to cumulate a sentence with prior outstanding sentences if the later sentence is imposed for the first time following the revocation of probation. However, if the applicant has already served a portion of his sentence before the sentence is suspended or probated, then a cumulation order may not be entered to stack the probated sentence on a subsequent sentence because such would violate the constitutional protection against being twice punished for the same offense. This court directly addressed this issue 12 years ago in Ex Parte Barley, 842 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Barley, the court held that a cumulation order may not be entered, not only in cases where a defendant has begun to serve his sentence or in cases where shock probation is revoked, but also in cases where a defendant is sentenced to boot camp and is subsequently released on probation. The court held that the execution of the sentence for both offenses commenced when the defendant was sent to boot camp. Barley had already begun serving time in both concurrent sentences. By later stacking the sentences, the trial court had interrupted one of the sentences to have Barley begin serving another. Consequently, cumulating the sentences in Barley violated his constitutional protection against being punished twice for the same offense. Under Barley, a trial court is without authority to stack a prior sentence that an applicant has already begun to serve in boot camp on the end of a subsequent sentence. The court overrules Barley to the extent that it stands for the proposition that an applicant can raise this claim for the first time in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. There was nothing to prevent the applicant from raising this claim on direct appeal. He had an adequate remedy at law. Because the applicant did not raise the issue on direct appeal, the applicant has forfeited his claim. The court reaffirms that when a defendant has an adequate remedy at law, the merits of his claim may not be reviewed on an application for a writ of habeas corpus. To the extent that Barley holds that an improper stacking order claim may be brought for the first time in an application for a writ of habeas corpus, it is overruled. OPINION:Price, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., and Womack, Keasler, Hervey, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Holcomb, J., concurs in the judgment. Meyers, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Johnson, J., joined. DISSENT:Meyers, J.; Johnson, J., joins. “I feel that instead of concluding that applicant’s claim was forfeited, we should consider the merits and follow our decision in Barley v. State, 842 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), stating that “a cumulation order may not be entered once the defendant has begun to serve his sentence because such would violate the constitutional protection against being twice punished for the same offense. . . .newly imposed sentences may not be cumulated because the defendant has already served a portion of his sentence before having the execution of the sentence suspended.”

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