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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A man in a four-door maroon car stopped Shelly Simmons, a prostitute, one night, told her to “come here,” flashed a badge, claimed to be a police officer, and told her to get in the car. As they drove down the seawall in Galveston toward the end of East Beach, Simmons cried because she thought she was going to jail. At one point, the driver stopped the car, walked to the trunk, and returned with what sounded like a police radio. As they proceeded to drive down the beach, he told Simmons that he did not want to take her to jail because it was almost time for his shift change and he did not want to have to do the paperwork. They stopped on the beach, and he told Simmons that she would have to perform oral sex on him or go to jail. While she continued to cry, he pulled her head down to his lap and forced her to perform oral sex on him. After a brief time, she refused to continue and said that he would just have to take her to jail. He took Simmons back to town and let her out of the car. She took note of the license plate number as the car left the scene. Several days later, Simmons saw the same car and driver, and decided to report the incident to the police. She described her assailant as “kind of chunky” and “not very muscular,” with a baby face and blond hair parted on the side. She also gave the police the maroon car’s license plate number. The number was traced to appellant and his Galveston address. Simmons identified appellant as her assailant from a photo line-up and in open court. Evidence showed that appellant was not, in fact, a police officer but was a prison guard who had not been issued a badge. Following a search of appellant’s apartment and car, police recovered a badge and a police scanner radio. During direct examination of Simmons at trial, the State did not question her about appellant’s specific weight. On cross-examination, however, defense counsel queried her about her description of her assailant as weighing 200 pounds, while the defendant in fact weighed 265 pounds. In addition to calling the victim and law enforcement personnel to the stand, the State called two other Galveston prostitutes. Outside the presence of the jury, one testified that appellant came up to her in a maroon sedan, said he was a police officer, asked for oral sex, and said he would not arrest her for prostitution if she complied. Another testified that appellant approached her in a maroon car and arranged to pay her to perform sexual acts for him. After driving to East Beach, appellant identified himself as a police officer and said he would not take her to jail, but refused to pay her. When she declined to act without pay, he hit her and forced her to have intercourse and oral sex with him. Appellant objected to the testimony of these two witnesses on the basis of Rules 404(b) and 403. The state argued that the evidence was admissible because Simmons’ testimony had been impeached by cross-examination about appellant’s weight and about Simmons’ drug use. The state also claimed that her testimony was impeached by defense counsel’s questions to Officer Kershaw suggesting that the photo line-up was tainted. Appellant argued that identity was not in question, claiming that Simmons “nail[ed] him to a ‘T’” and that the jury had no doubt something went on between them. The trial court ruled that the testimony was admissible, telling defense counsel, “If you’re not questioning identity, you sure could have fooled me.” The court of appeals held that admitting the evidence of extraneous offenses was error, because the cross-examination about weight did not rise to the level of impeachment, its weight was inconsequential in relation to the overall strength of the case proving identity, and that the impeachment did not relate to a material detail of her identification. Consequently, the court of appeals held that identity was not an issue in the case and the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). HOLDING:The court holds that defense cross-examination regarding the actual and described weight of the defendant did place identity in issue and consequently reverses the court of appeals’ decision. The court reviews the courts of appeals’ decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. For proof of identity to be a valid purpose, it must be an issue in the case. Identity can be raised by defense cross-examination, such as when the identifying witness is impeached on a material detail of the identification. Here, defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim suggested that his 265-pound client was not her 200-pound assailant. Whether the challenge was to her capacity to observe, her truthfulness, or both, the questions implied that the identification of appellant was not trustworthy. The question of whether defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim raised the issue of identity may best be answered with another question: If it was not about identity, what was it about? Defense counsel did not offer the trial court an alternative explanation for his line of questioning, and none is apparent. Counsel simply denied making identity an issue. The court also says its prior pronouncements regarding impeachment relating to a “material detail” of identification simply mean that the detail must be relevant to the reliability of the identification, not that it must have any particular strength. The court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. OPINION:Sharon Keller, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Meyers, Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Johnson, J., concurred in the result.

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