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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS: Mousa Elias Salameh Shokeh appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. �2241 habeas petition, arguing that the district court erred in holding that his post-removal-order release was permissibly conditioned on his posting $5,000 bond. HOLDING: Reversed and remanded. After a final order of removal is entered, 8 U.S.C. �1231 provides for detention of immigrants pending actual removal. Faced with the issue “whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States,” the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678 (2001), that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by [8 U.S.C. � 1231].” The court explained that �1231 has two main purposes: 1. “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings;” and 2. “preventing danger to the community.” “[B]y definition the first justification-preventing flight-is weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best.” And while the rationale behind protecting the community “does not necessarily diminish in force over time . . . [the Supreme Court has] upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Because cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex (“the rationale of a legal rule no longer being applicable, that rule itself no longer applies”), the court read a reasonableness term into the statute. Although 8 U.S.C. �1231 does not list bond as a condition of release, in Zadvydas the court noted that “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable[,] . . . the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions.” Given this language in Zadvydas, the court holds that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9 thCir. 2002). Because of the Zadvydas court’s focus on “reasonableness,” the court holds that when a bond is one of the conditions of release, that bond must be reasonable and “appropriate in the circumstances.” The court further holds that a bond that has the effect of preventing an immigrant’s release because of inability to pay and that results in “potentially permanent” detention is presumptively unreasonable. Because the reasonableness of the bond is dependent on facts not fully developed in the record, the court remands this case for further factual findings concerning Shokeh’s access to assets, and for the ultimate legal conclusion as to whether Shokeh’s $5,000 bond was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. OPINION: Clement, J.; Higginbotham, Dennis and Clement, JJ.

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