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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Douglas Brocail was a pitcher for the Detroit Tigers. In 2000, Brocail injured his elbow during the baseball season, and he was referred by the Tigers organization to a team doctor, Dr. Kyle Anderson, at the Henry Ford Health Systems in Michigan. Anderson recommended arthroscopic surgery for the elbow, and after discussing the procedure and the potential rehabilitation of the elbow, Anderson performed the surgery in September 2000. After the surgery, Anderson recommended weeks of rehabilitation. Since the season was over, and Brocail wanted to return to his home in Houston for the off-season, Brocail asked Anderson to prescribe physical therapy through a provider in Texas. Anderson faxed a prescription for physical therapy to a facility in Sugar Land, HealthSouth. From October 2000 to January 2001, Anderson consulted with the physical therapist in Texas, reviewed Brocail’s progress, prescribed more physical therapy and suggested various exercises. Anderson did much of this through the exchange of faxes, but Brocail and Anderson disagree whether they had any phone conversations. The Tigers traded Brocail on Jan. 25, 2001, to the Houston Astros and directed that any of Brocail’s further medical bills be forwarded to that organization. Brocail sued Anderson and several other defendants, including the Detroit Tigers, in a Harris County district court. He alleged medical negligence, gross negligence and fraud. Anderson filed a special appearance contesting jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. Anderson specially noted six facts 1. he is licensed to practice medicine in Michigan, but not Texas; 2. he practices medicine exclusively in Michigan; 3. he has never practiced medicine in Texas; 4. he has never owned property or had bank accounts in Texas; 5. he has not advertised or attempted to solicit business in Texas; and 6. he is domiciled in Michigan. Brocail appeals. He argues that jurisdiction over Anderson is proper for four main reasons: 1. Anderson referred Brocail to a physical therapy provider in Texas; 2. he faxed prescriptions for initial and continued treatment to Texas; 3. he received and reviewed information on Brocail’s progress from Texas; and 4. he made and forwarded additional diagnoses and prescriptions for treatment to Texas. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court reviews all of the standards and considerations that must be included in an analysis of whether a Texas court can exercise special or general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. The court notes Brocail’s argument that he could not have received treatment in Texas without a doctor’s approval, and that Anderson could have foreseen being called into a Texas court over his continued treatment of Brocail. On the other hand, Anderson argues that he was the team doctor for the Detroit Tigers, he performed the surgery in Michigan and rehabilitation would have been in Michigan had Brocail not chosen to go to Texas on his own. The court examines cases from several other states to see how they deal with the issue of out-of-state doctors, including Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972). In Wright the court rejected the notion of a “portable tort,” determining that a doctor’s focus is on a person, not on a place. The case has been followed in Texas by the 5th and 6th Circuit Courts of Appeals. The court also reviews cases from Arkansas, California, Oklahoma and South Carolina. The court finds this case is similar to those other cases. Aside from the facts noted by Anderson (above), the court also points out that Anderson never went to Texas and may not have even known where exactly Brocail lived. There was no evidence that Anderson told Brocail to use HealthSouth or any other specific physical therapy facility. Though Anderson reviewed Brocail’s progress and suggested a few exercises, he did not bill Brocail for his services and Brocail did not make any payments. Anderson’s relationship with Texas are “at their best, fortuitous and attenuated and, worse arise from another’s acts.” The court adds that this is a close case, and that two events � prescribing an elbow splint and suggesting an exercise of “light tossing” increase the chances of asserting jurisdiction � but by themselves do not throw the balance toward asserting jurisdiction. OPINION:Fowler, J.; Yates, Hudson and Fowler, JJ.

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