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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Jay E. Hartsell d/b/a Security Custom Homes, Countryside Development I L.P., Winner’s Circle Partners Ltd., Countryside Fireside L.P., Countryside Country Arbor L.P., and Countryside Emerald Ranch L.P. appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of the town of Talty. The appellants are homebuilders and developers. The town is a general law town in Kaufman County. The appellants brought suit and applied for a temporary restraining order and injunction “to restrain and enjoin the Town from taking any action to apply the Ordinance to their construction” in the town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, and further sought declaratory judgments regarding the application of the Ordinance to their construction. The town counterclaimed against the appellants, requesting a declaratory judgment that the ordinance “is valid and applies to construction on [Appellants'] properties.” The parties submitted all questions of fact and law to the trial judge. On June 11, 2003, the trial judge signed a declaratory judgment “upholding the validity of the Town’s ordinance which extends the Town’s building codes into the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.” The appellants were enjoined from commencing or continuing any further construction of structures within the town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction until they complied with the town’s building codes. The trial judge also awarded attorneys’ fees to the town. HOLDING:Reversed and rendered in part; remanded in part. The appellants argue Chapter 245 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits the town’s extension of the building code to appellants’ construction in the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The town “recognizes that Appellants possess vested rights in the development of their subdivisions and that the filing of a preliminary plat application triggers the application of Appellants’ vested rights.” The town contends that appellants’ preliminary plat application is a “project” distinct and separate from the construction of an individual residence within that subdivision. The town cites the definition of “project” in �245.001(3) of Chapter 245: “‘Project’ means an endeavor over which a regulatory agency exerts its jurisdiction and for which one or more permits are required to initiate, continue, or complete the endeavor.” Texas Local Government Code �245.001(3). The town argues the subdivision “project” involves submission and approval of a preliminary and final plat and the installation of streets and utility infrastructure, while the building “project” involves construction of individual homes. For the town, the former “project” involves “consideration of the overall community, . . . the traffic, the drainage, and the population generated by the proposed subdivision,” while the latter “project” involves “determination of compliance with various codes and ordinances that primarily relate to structural integrity and minimal safety requirements.” The town also notes if the “projects” are not considered to be separate, a lot may sit vacant for years, then a builder may construct a home “based on outdated and obsolete building codes.” The town’s interpretation of the term “project” is not supported by the plain language of Chapter 245. Section 245.002(b) contemplates that a “series of permits” may be required “for completion of the project.” Under �245.002(b), “[a]ll permits required for the project are considered to be a single series of permits,” and the regulations and ordinances in effect “at the time the original application for the first permit in that series is filed shall be the sole basis for consideration of all subsequent permits required for the completion of the project.” Similarly, the definition of “project” contemplates “one or more permits” may be “required to initiate, continue, or complete the endeavor.” While the town raises the specter of homes built according to obsolete building codes years after the approval of a plat, no such facts are presented here. The trial judge heard evidence that construction of homes had already begun. Moreover, Chapter 245 addresses this concern in other sections; the town does not contend these sections apply to this case. Chapter 245 prohibits application of the ordinance to appellants’ projects approved before the ordinance was enacted. The appellants do not challenge the reasonableness of the town’s attorneys’ fees, or allege the award was not equitable and just. They argue only that fees should not have been awarded because the town should not have prevailed in the trial court. In State Farm Lloyds v. Borum, 53 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied), when presented with a similar issue, the court remands the cause to the trial court to reconsider its award of attorneys’ fees in light of the court’s reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment. OPINION:Molly Francis, J.; James, O’Neill and Francis, JJ.

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