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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Gary Salinas was convicted of capital murder and attempted capital murder, and was sentenced to two life sentences. A Texas intermediate appeals court affirmed the judgment without opinion on July 20, 2000, but Salinas’ attorney did not notify him of this fact for more than seven months. Consequently, Salinas did not file the customary petition for discretionary review (PDR), or a motion for extension of time to file the PDR, with the Court of Criminal Appeals. When his attorney did notify him, he was told there was no issue meriting discretionary review and that the only possible remedy was for Salinas to perhaps file a petition for habeas corpus. Salinas, acting pro se, filed a PDR and a motion for extension of time on April 7, 2001, but this was dismissed as time-barred on April 19. Salinas then filed a state habeas petition, which, after a brief remand, the CCA denied on March 13, 2002. Salinas then filed a federal habeas petition on April 28. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. �2244(d)(1) says that a “1-year period of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” and according to �(d)(1)(A), “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” In Texas, a PDR is considered to be part of the direct review process, which ends when the petition is denied or when the time available for filing the petition lapses. Salinas had 30 days from his July 20, 2000, conviction to file a PDR with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Aug. 19, 2000, was a Saturday, he had until Aug. 21, to file a PDR and until Aug. 21 of the following year to seek federal habeas relief. The district court agreed with the state’s position that the petition was time-barred under the act. The district court declined to equitably toll the statute of limitations, and dismissed the petition on Nov. 18. On the same day, and unknown to the district court, Salinas mailed a letter to that court stating that the CCA, acting on its own motion, reconsidered Salinas’ state habeas petition and on Oct. 30, 2002, decided to award Salinas the right to file an “out-of-time” PDR. The ruling specifically stated that for purposes of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, “all time limits shall be calculated as the Court of Appeals’ decision had been rendered on the day the mandate of the Court of Criminal Appeals issues.” The CCA eventually denied the PDR in January 2003. Salinas’ letter asked the district court to dismiss his federal habeas petition, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court decided it did not have jurisdiction since it had already granted the state’s motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred. Salinas claims on appeal that the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. He claims that in light of the CCA’s ruling, his federal habeas petition is actually premature, not time-barred. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court first confirms that Salinas’ appeal has been properly preserved and that the court has jurisdiction. Then the court rejects Salinas’ argument that his conviction was “de-finalized” by the CCA’s order in October 2002: that the direct review was actually still pending at the time of the district court’s dismissal on Nov. 18. “On its face, AEDPA provides for only a linear limitations period, one that starts and ends on specific dates, with only the possibility that tolling will expand the period in between. . . . So long as the petitioner is being held pursuant to the same state court judgment, nothing in AEDPA allows for a properly initiated limitations period to be terminated altogether by collateral state court action. Rather, the statutory framework only provides for the tolling of limitations during the pendency of state collateral review.” The court concludes that the CCA’s ruling to allow an out-of-time PDR served only to toll the statute of limitations period under the AEDPA, not to restart it. The reason, the court explains, is because Salinas’ right to file the out-of-time PDR is necessarily the product of the state habeas review process, and is not part of the direct review process. “Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ granting of Salinas’s writ does not alter the fact that limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. � 2244(d)(1)(A), properly began to run on August 21, 2000, and fully lapsed on March 31, 2002. OPINION:Smith, J.; Smith, Barksdale and Clement, JJ.

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