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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A jury convicted appellant, Carlos Martinez Dominguez, of the felony of capital murder for intentionally causing the death of the complainant while in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. The jury answered special issue one “yes,” finding that appellant would constitute a continuing threat to society. The jury answered special issue two “yes,” finding that a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances warranted a life sentence rather than a death sentence. Accordingly, the trial court imposed a life sentence. In point of error one, appellant contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to support a conviction for capital murder. In points of error two and three, appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm. In point of error four, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the state’s closing arguments at the guilt-innocence stage. HOLDING: Affirmed. A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual and intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnaping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, or obstruction or retaliation. Texas Penal Code ��19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, or intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. �29.02(a). Intent is most often proven through the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, such as the acts, words and conduct of the defendant. Additionally, intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, unless it would not be reasonable to infer that death or serious bodily injury could result from the use of the weapon. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The appellant’s factual-sufficiency challenge relies on the following: 1. no evidence established that appellant agreed with the members of his gang to rob anyone; 2. no evidence was introduced that anyone ever demanded money or other property from Brown; 3. no evidence established that appellant ever intended, or stated that he intended, to kill or rob anyone; 4. no evidence established that the shotgun fired as a result of Brown’s grabbing or touching it during the struggle; 5. no evidence indicated that the recovered shotgun shell had been fired from the shotgun linked to appellant; and 6. Brown threw the money to the ground for some reason other than a threat or request from appellant or his gang. The jury, however, could reasonably have found the following from the evidence: 1. appellant and the members of his gang planned to rob an individual they found walking alone at night; 2. appellant and the members of his gang first attempted to rob Brandon Williams, who managed to escape; 3. appellant and the members of his gang then turned their attention to William Brown, another individual they found walking alone, and attempted to rob him; 4. in the course of the theft or attempted theft of Brown, appellant retrieved a loaded shotgun from the trunk of one of the fellow gang member’s cars and shot Brown in the abdomen from a distance of three feet or greater; and 5. Brown died as a result of the gunshot wound. The jury was entitled to infer intent to kill from appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. Additionally, the jury was entitled to infer intent to kill from appellant’s acts and conduct. The court concludes that the verdict is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, and that the proof of guilt is not so weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination. The court overrules the appellant’s other points of error. OPINION:Elsa Alcala, J.; Radack, C.J., Keyes and Alcala, JJ.

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