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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS: The appellant, Freddy Crenshaw, was charged with capital murder. A jury found the appellant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. In six points of error, appellant contends that 1. the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Orlando Castaneda and Vanessa Reyes; 2. the trial court erred in excluding testimony from Audra Berlanga about an alleged robbery committed by Orlando and Vanessa; and 3. the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine Orlando and to elicit testimony from Audra Berlanga about the robbery allegedly committed by Orlando and Vanessa. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine Orlando and Vanessa regarding their purported involvement in the alleged robbery. The court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Audra Berlanga to testify regarding Orlando’s and Vanessa’s purported involvement in the alleged extraneous offense to show a potential interest or motive for testifying against appellant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Audra Berlanga’s testimony. Prior conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness or proved by extrinsic evidence. Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b). If, while testifying, a witness creates a false impression of law abiding behavior, she “opens the door” on her otherwise irrelevant past criminal history, and opposing counsel may expose the falsehood. Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). This exception to the general rule of inadmissibility does not, however, apply to permit opposing counsel to rely on his own interrogation during cross-examination to contradict the witness and then admit evidence of collateral matters which would otherwise be inadmissible. In the instant case, Orlando’s response was induced by the leading question propounded by defense counsel during cross-examination. Defense counsel’s question suggested that Orlando’s motivation was “to look good” when he talked to the police, and his answer was in response to that question. Because the exception to the general rule of inadmissibility does not apply to permit opposing counsel to rely on his own interrogation during cross-examination to contradict the witness and then admit evidence of collateral matters which would otherwise be inadmissible, the court holds that the trial court was correct in refusing to allow the admission of evidence regarding the alleged extraneous robbery. OPINION:Hedges, J.; Hedges, Nuchia, and Higley, JJ.

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