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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Callon Petroleum Co. brought this diversity action against Frontier Insurance Co. to collect on a bond it had issued in Callon’s favor and moved for summary judgment. Frontier subsequently became represented by Gregory Serio, the New York state superintendent of insurance as rehabilitator, who failed to respond to the motion, and the district court granted summary judgment. Over a year later, the superintendent, after three notices of the judgment, moved to have the adverse summary judgment vacated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). HOLDING:Affirmed. The superintendent contends that at the time of the district court’s grant of summary judgment, jurisdiction over Callon’s claim had vested exclusively in the New York Supreme Court. That is, by virtue of commencement of rehabilitation proceedings in the New York state courts, the federal district court in Louisiana no longer maintained jurisdiction over the action. Had the superintendent timely moved the district court to dismiss or stay this action on Burford abstention grounds ( Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)), it would have been proper, if not obligatory, for the district court to have done so. However, these are not the facts before the court. It is clear that the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the case; although federal courts usually apply state law when exercising diversity jurisdiction, they are not automatically stripped of subject matter jurisdiction over claims asserted against an insurer undergoing state insolvency or rehabilitation proceedings. Rule 60(b)(4) relief is warranted if a district court’s actions are inconsistent with due process of law. Here, Frontier � and subsequently the superintendent � were fully aware of the summary judgment proceedings and had a fully adequate opportunity to be heard: Frontier was afforded the opportunity to brief Callon’s summary judgment motion and to appear at oral argument; and the superintendent had notice that the district court had entered judgment for over a year before he finally acted. Thus, although the superintendent may argue that he had no opportunity to argue for a stay or dismissal based on the order to show cause before the judgment was entered, he nevertheless had notice of the judgment and ample time to present in a more timely manner his arguments for Rule 60(b) relief, yet he failed to respond for some 14 months. These facts do not allow the superintendent to hide his failings behind the skirts of a due process argument. Because the superintendent offers no plausible excuse for ignoring the judgment of the district court � a judgment of which he was fully apprised � for some 14 months, the court holds that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying the superintendent’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. OPINION:Jolly, J.

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