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Click here for the full text of this decision The refusal to allow the defendant the opportunity to question a venire member about her views on the death penalty is error subject to harm analysis. FACTS:The appellant was convicted in December 2000 of capital murder. The appellant claims the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s challenge for cause against venire member, Brenda S. Looney, without allowing the appellant’s counsel an opportunity to question her. The trial court conducted Looney’s voir dire and devoted its questioning almost exclusively to the issue of her ability to follow the law in light of her personal views about the death penalty. The state challenged her for cause on the ground that she opposed the death penalty, and its challenge was granted. The appellant objected to the granting of the challenge without being given an opportunity to question Looney. The appellant relies on Perillo v. State, 656 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), for his claim that his counsel should have been allowed to question Looney and he relies on Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), and Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976), in support of his argument that the error is not subject to a harm analysis. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court modifies the standard for determining error when the trial court denies a defendant’s request to question individually a venire member in a capital case. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 35.17 �2 is the basis for the appellant’s objection that he was not provided an opportunity to question the venire member about her views on the death penalty. Although the trial court has a great deal of discretion in placing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination, Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the statute is clear. The trial court, upon demand of either party, is required to permit that party to individually question a venire member on the principles already discussed by the trial court. As a result, a trial court that denies a party’s request has erred. In light of Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), such error is now subject to a harm analysis. And, because the appellant’s complaint is that he was not afforded an opportunity to question the venire member under Article 35.17, the court reviews the record for harm under the nonconstitutional standard provided in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Under Rule 44.2(b), the court disregards all nonconstitutional errors that do not affect the appellant’s substantial rights. The court has held that a substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In this case, the trial court explained the special issues to the venire member. After the explanation, the trial court began to question the venire member about her views on the death penalty. At first, the venire member said that she could answer the special issues according to the evidence even if it meant that the trial court would impose a death sentence. Then the trial court questioned the venire member about the questionnaire she had completed. In the questionnaire, the venire member said that she was opposed to the death penalty because she could not put anyone to death. The venire member vacillated on whether she could impose the death penalty until the trial court asked her about her questionnaire response that the death penalty may be appropriate in certain cases, but that she could never return a verdict that would require the trial court to impose a death sentence. When asked about this, she said that her personal feelings would override any evidence that was presented during the trial and that she could never return a verdict of death. She also explained that she holds religious beliefs against the death penalty. Given the venire member’s testimony, it is highly unlikely that the appellant would have been able to convince her to say otherwise or that the trial court would have abused its discretion in dismissing her for cause. The court has a fair assurance that the trial court’s error did not influence the outcome of the trial. The appellant’s other points of error are overruled. OPINION:Price, J.; Meyers, Womack, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb and Cochran, JJ., join. Keller, P.J., concurs in the judgment.

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