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Click here for the full text of this decision Appellant’s general objection failed to preserve error in the absence of anything in the record reflecting that the court or opposing counsel knew the specific basis of appellant’s claim. FACTS:Appellant was convicted in July 2001 of capital murder. HOLDING:Affirmed. A pretrial identification procedure may be so suggestive and conducive to misidentification that use of the identification at trial would deprive the defendant of due process. Barley v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 (1996). A two-step test is applied to assess the admissibility of an in-court identification: 1. whether the out-of-court procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and 2. whether the suggestive procedure gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The court views the totality of the circumstances and make a determination of the reliability of the identification. In determining whether a very substantial likelihood of irreparable identification has occurred, several factors are taken into consideration: 1. the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal act; 2. the witness’ degree of attention; 3. the accuracy of the suspect’s description; 4. the level of certainty at the time of confrontation; and 5. the time between the crime and confrontation. These factors are weighed against the corrupting effect of any suggestive identification procedures. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress the out-of-court identification evidence. The appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the state’s DNA evidence on the grounds that proper DNA testing procedures were not followed and that the DNA results were not reliable due to error in the actual testing process. The trial court’s task under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 is to determine whether the proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant to assist the jury. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); The appellant’s claim is directed at the reliability issue. Reliability is established by showing 1. the validity of the underlying scientific theory; 2. the validity of the technique applying the theory; and 3. the proper application of the technique on the occasion in question. The trial court is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence presented, and the reviewing court looks at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the state’s witnesses testified to the reliability, validity and proper application of the DNA testing procedures and met each challenge by appellant with reasonable and coherent explanations as to why the tests utilized and the results should be viewed as reliable. The appellant claims the trial court should have granted his request for a mistrial after the state prompted an extreme emotional outburst from the victim’s wife, Lora, in front of the jury. The statements by Lora during her outburst were not directed at the defendant. While the prosecutor referred to the outburst once during his closing argument, he was responding to an argument of defense counsel. And the appellant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument. The prosecutor’s conduct did not rise to the level of the misconduct described in Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The appellant has not shown that the trial court otherwise abused its discretion in denying his mistrial. The appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence appellant’s prison records, which were not certified or self-authenticating. When appellant did not specify the ground for his claim, the state did not have the opportunity to respond and the trial court was not apprised of the basis on which to rule. In these circumstances, the appellant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Appellant’s remaining points of error are overruled. OPINION:Holcomb, J.; Meyers, Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey and Cochran, JJ., join. Keller, P.J., joined the opinion of the court except its discussion of point of error number two, with which she concurred in the result. Johnson, J., joined the opinion of the court except its discussion of point of error number four, with which she concurred in the result.

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