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Judge Kaplan http://nycourts.law.com/CourtDocumentViewer.asp?view=Document&docID=41158 DEFENDANT’S MOTION to dismiss two informations on speedy trial grounds required the court to determine whether his failure to appear should result in a subsequent adjournment, which was made upon his return that same day, being excluded from the speedy trial calculation. A bench warrant issued upon defendant’s failure to appear was vacated later that same day. The court dismissed one information, calculating that 111 days had elapsed since his arraignment. It found that the period of delay resulting from defendant’s absence was only a few hours and could not be regarded as an indication that he was “attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.” Citing People v. Luperon, the court noted that Criminal Procedure Law �30.30(4)(c)(ii) instructs that the period of excludable delay is measured from the day the court issues a bench warrant to the day the defendant subsequently appears. Thus, assuming defendant “absconded” for part of a day, the number of excludable days would be zero.

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