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Banking, Business & Contracts Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Redwood Group L.L.C. brings a restricted appeal from a no-answer default judgment recovered by Robert Louiseau (the receiver) in his capacity as special deputy receiver for some 21 individuals and artificial legal entities involved in the business of insurance. HOLDINGReversed and remanded. Copies of the citations referred to in the two returns do not appear in the record. Each of the two returns is accompanied instead by an affidavit made by a Texas process server. Each affidavit declares that the Texas process server received on specified dates the citation and original petition referred to in the respective returns. No “declaration of not found” is attached to either affidavit. Notwithstanding the confusion inherent in the last sentence of the foregoing quotation, it appears that the affiant -� the Texas process server -� requests that each of the two affidavits be used with the pertinent return “to confirm that service” was perfected or that it failed of perfection because the person to whom citation was directed could not be found. While a return is prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein, this does not mean that the return is prima facie evidence of anything about which it is silent. For example, the two returns in question here contain nothing about the contents of the two lost citations; the court cannot presume they conformed to the requirements of the rule of civil procedure specifying the contents of a valid citation. It appears from the record that the receiver attempted service of citation through the secretary of state of Texas as a means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over Redwood. A copy of this citation appears in the record together with a verified return made by a Texas process server. The return records that the citation and a copy of the receiver’s original petition were received by the process server on March 15, 2002, and executed on March 18, 2002, by delivery of the documents to the secretary of state. Assuming Redwood was amendable to service of process under the relevant statutory provisions (Texas Revised Civil Statutes arts. 1528n, 2.08B, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code �17.044(a)(1), �17.044(b) and �17.045(a), (d)), it is essential that the record show affirmatively that the secretary of state forwarded a copy of the citation and attached original petition to Redwood after receiving the documents; so much is expressly required by the statutes themselves. The record is silent on the question of whether the secretary of state forwarded the documents as required. In addition, the receiver’s original petition does not allege the essential jurisdictional fact that Redwood failed to appoint or maintain a registered agent in Texas. The court holds in consequence that the record does not show that the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over Redwood by delivery of the pertinent documents to the secretary of state. The receiver contends the record shows affirmatively that Redwood appeared generally in the cause by implication, rendering service of process upon Redwood unnecessary. Redwood’s general appearance resulted, according to the receiver, from a district court order extending a temporary restraining order apparently obtained by the receiver when he initiated the lawsuit. The trial judge signed the order extending the temporary restraining order on March 15, 2002, the same day the receiver filed his original petition. As a basis for the extension of the temporary restraining order, the order recites over the trial judge’s signature that the extension was based on “good cause,” to wit: the parties had “agreed to extend the TRO [sic] for at least fourteen (14) days,” as indicated by a Rule 11 agreement attached to the extension order as an “exhibit.” The attached “exhibit” is a copy of a letter dated, curiously, March 27, 2002, or twelve days after the trial judge signed on March 15, 2002, the order extending the temporary restraining order. The record does not reveal that the attorneys’ Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 agreement was ever filed in the cause in the ordinary sense implied by Rule 11, that is to say, as an independent paper in the cause; the agreement bears no file mark. Rather, the agreement appears in the record only as an “exhibit” to the trial court’s order extending the temporary restraining order. While it was thus in a constructive sense “filed” by someone, the record does not indicate that Redwood or its attorney did so. And while the Rule 11 agreement made possible a court action based thereon, the agreement itself invoked nothing. It was no more than a private agreement between the attorneys until “tendered to the Court” for an extension and it sought nothing unless and until it was so tendered. Who made the tender is not revealed by the record. It may not be said that the agreement affirmatively recognized the court’s personal jurisdiction over Redwood. Paragraph 3 of the letter agreement expressly preserved Redwood’s right to challenge the district court’s jurisdiction by a special appearance under Rule 120a or by any other means. The court holds the record does not show a constructive general appearance by Redwood. The decision in Exito Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Trejo, 99 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App. � Corpus Christi 2003, pet. filed), is not to the contrary. There, the court specifically declined to address the issue of a constructive appearance arising from a Rule 11 agreement that was, as here, expressly conditioned upon a determination of the personal-jurisdiction issue, in that instance in connection with a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. OPINION: Powers, J.; Law, C.J., Puryear and Powers, JJ.

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