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Ramon Fernandez v The City of New York Hon. John G. Koeltl Plaintiffs Ramon Fernandez and Adalberto Fernandez bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 against defendants the City of New York (the “City”) and New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), Officer Robert Thomson (“Thomson”) and Officer Hatzidarn (“Hatzidarn”), and unknown John and Jane Doe(s) (Thomson, Hatzidarn and John and Jane Doe(s) collectively “NYPD Defendants”) (City of New York, NYPD, and NYPD Defendants collectively “City Defendants”) in their official and individual capacities, as well as Ross Radtke (“Radtke”). The plaintiffs allege that the City Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs claim that the NYPD Defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned them. The plaintiffs also allege that the NYPD Defendants maliciously prosecuted Ramon Fernandez and engaged in abuse of process against Ramon Fernandez in violation of Ramon Fernandez’s constitutional and civil rights. The plaintiffs contend that defendants John and Jane Doe(s) failed to properly investigate, supervise, and discipline the actions of the offending officers. The plaintiffs assert that the City was negligent in hiring, training, and failing to supervise the NYPD Defendants. The plaintiffs also bring claims of defamation and private nuisance against Radtke. The City Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I. On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true. Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1998). In deciding a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989). The Court’s function on a motion to dismiss is “not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). Therefore, the defendants’ present motion should only be granted if it appears that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Grandon, 147 F.3d at 188; Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1065. The Court applies this standard “with particular strictness” in view of the plaintiffs’ allegations of civil rights violations. Brodeur v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 651, 2002 WL 424688, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the Complaint, documents that the plaintiffs relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiffs’ possession or that the plaintiffs knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991); Skeete v. IVF, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Vtech Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). For the purposes of this motion, the following facts are accepted as true. The NYPD Defendants were and still are police officers or personnel of the NYPD employed and acting under the direction of the City. (Compl. ¶7.) Defendants John and Jane Doe(s) are the fictitious names of police officers who were involved in the acts complained of and/or who failed to train and supervise properly the other NYPD Defendants. (Compl. ¶7.) In the year prior to November 16, 2000, the plaintiffs and their mother, Hilda Fernandez, made multiple calls to the NYPD’s 114th precinct to complain of excessive noise and improper behavior on the part of Radtke, who lived in an apartment directly above the plaintiffs’ apartment. (Compl. ¶12.) The Complaint alleges that despite the fact that the NYPD was aware of Radtke’s noise and improper behavior, as well as threats that Radtke made while banging on the plaintiffs’ apartment door, the NYPD failed to take action against Radtke. (Compl. ¶13.) Instead, the City, through the NYPD, claimed that the issue was one for the landlord to address rather than the police. (Compl. ¶14.) In the beginning of November, 2000, Radtke wrote to the NYPD regarding the complaints that the plaintiffs were filing against him. (Compl. ¶17.) The letter stated that Radtke and his family were “subjected to harassment and nuisance perpetrated by all three occupants of” the plaintiffs’ apartment. (Letter from Ross H. Radtke to New York City Police Department, 114th Precinct dated Nov. 8, 2000 (“Radtke Letter”) attached as Ex. A to Declaration of Dan Cherner dated Mar. 18, 2003). Radtke also wrote that officers from the 114th precinct had recently visited his apartment repeatedly in response to complaints by the plaintiffs. (Radtke Letter.) On more than three occasions, the officers allegedly instructed the plaintiffs to “never call again.” (Radtke Letter.) Approximately eight to ten days later, on November 16, 2000, the plaintiffs allege that Radtke banged on the plaintiffs’ door at 6:30-7:00 p.m. and, when Ramon Fernandez answered, proceeded to threaten and insult Ramon Fernandez before stating “I’ll see you in court” and leaving the area. (Compl. ¶¶15-16.) Defendant Thomson and other NYPD officers arrived at the plaintiffs’ apartment about 30 minutes later. (Compl. ¶18.) In response to the officers’ banging, Adalberto Fernandez opened the apartment door. (Compl. ¶19.) The officers entered the apartment pointing to Adalberto Fernandez and stating “arrest him, arrest him.” (Compl. ¶20.) Adalberto Fernandez asked to officers what they were talking about and defendant Thomson stated that Adalberto Fernandez had punched Radtke in the face. (Compl. ¶21.) Adalberto Fernandez denied the allegations against him. (Compl. ¶22.) Thomson reacted aggressively in response, stating “you want some violence, you want some violence,” and put his hand on his gun. (Compl. ¶22.) The plaintiffs contend that Adalberto Fernandez was effectively under arrest at this time. (Compl. ¶23.) The officers next brought Radtke’s son to the plaintiffs’ apartment and the son stated that Ramon Fernandez punched Radtke in the face and ransacked Radtke’s apartment. (Compl. ¶24.) When the officers began to arrest Ramon Fernandez, Adalberto Fernandez asked about the reason for the arrest and Thomson told him that Ramon Fernandez had gone to Radtke’s apartment, punched Radtke in the face, and ransacked the apartment. (Compl. ¶25.) Thomson also stated that there was blood all over Radtke’s apartment. (Compl. ¶25.) Adalberto Fernandez told the officers that Ramon Fernandez had not left the apartment and that, instead, Radtke had come to the plaintiffs’ apartment to threaten them. (Compl. ¶26.) Adalberto Fernandez also reminded the officers that the plaintiffs had made several complaints about Radtke to the police. (Compl. ¶26.) The officers proceeded to arrest Ramon Fernandez despite the plaintiffs’ allegation that the officers knew that Radtke lacked credibility and could not be believed. (Compl. ¶27.) Radtke refused medical treatment or an ambulance. (Compl. ¶28.) Ramon Fernandez was charged with third degree assault and second degree harassment on November 16, 2000. (Compl. ¶28.) In support of the charges against Ramon Fernandez, Thomson stated in a criminal complaint that Radtke told him that Ramon Fernandez struck Radtke with a closed fist causing Radtke to sustain bruising and swelling and substantial pain to his mouth. (Criminal Complaint dated Nov. 17, 2000 (“Criminal Complaint”) attached as Ex. B to Declaration of Genevieve E. Nelson dated Feb. 13, 2003.) The criminal complaint was supported by Radtke’s sworn confirming declaration that affirmed that the statements by Thomson were true to Radtke’s personal knowledge. (Criminal Complaint.) The assault charge was reduced on March 21, 2001 to attempted assault in the third degree. (Compl. ¶29.) On August 12, 2002, after a trial, Ramon Fernandez was found not guilty of attempted assault in the third degree and guilty of second degree harassment. (Compl. ¶30.) The plaintiffs allege that Radtke continued to make noise during the evenings and mornings between November 16, 2000 and June, 2002 in order to intentionally interfere with the plaintiffs’ use and quiet enjoyment of their residence. (Compl. ¶31.) II. The City Defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to establish probable cause, thus defeating the plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. [1] A false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 resting on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, “is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Under New York law, “a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification.” Id. (citations omitted). Probable cause constitutes such justification, and therefore probable cause “is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994); Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003); L.B. v. Town of Chester, 232 F. Supp. 2d 227, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). To sustain a §1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate conduct by the defendant that is tortious under state law and that results in a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of liberty. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Jenkins v. City of New York, 98 Civ. 7170, 98 Civ. 7338, 1999 WL 782509, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999), aff’d, 216 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 2000). To state a claim for malicious prosecution under New York State law, “a plaintiff must prove (1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Jenkins, 1999 WL 782509, at *11. Thus, the existence of probable cause to commence a proceeding is also a complete bar to a claim of malicious prosecution. See Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Jenkins, 1999 WL 782509, at *11; Funnye v. Paragon Sporting Goods, 98 Civ. 7731, 2001 WL 300740 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2001). Probable cause to arrest exists “when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (internal quotations marks omitted). The amount of evidence required to establish probable cause to arrest “need not reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction . . . but it must constitute more than rumor, suspicion, or even a strong reason to suspect.” United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a putative victim precisely identifies the alleged perpetrator of a crime and there is independent evidence to support at least some of the victim’s assertions, a person of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that an offense has been committed by the alleged perpetrator.” Marin v. Viggiani, 92 Civ. 3836, 1993 WL 404098, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1993). Probable cause can also be established by information from an eye witness “who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth.” Miloslavsky v. AES Eng’g Soc., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993) (table). The Court of Appeals has explained that “[a]n arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.” Singer, 63 F.2d at 119. “Information about criminal activity provided by a single complainant can establish probable cause when the information is sufficiently reliable and corroborated. Yet, even if bystander witnesses are considered presumptively reliable, a report of a crime alone will not necessarily establish probable cause.” Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). However, “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing that there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). Taking the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, the NYPD Defendants have established the existence of probable cause that defeats the plaintiffs’ allegations. The facts as alleged in the Complaint cannot be interpreted otherwise. Cf. Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 415-17 (2d Cir. 1999); Bullard v. City of New York, 240 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The plaintiffs allege, in substance, that Thomson and other NYPD officers came to their apartment in response to an alleged assault as reported by Radtke and his son. The NYPD Defendants thereafter brought Radtke’s son to the plaintiffs’ apartment and the son stated that Ramon Fernandez had punched Radtke in the face and ransacked Radtke’s apartment. There are no allegations in the Complaint that undercut the son’s veracity or eyewitness testimony, and the NYPD Defendants were entitled to rely on his testimony in establishing probable cause. Moreover, Thomson also indicated that there was corroborating physical evidence for the son’s story when he told Adalberto Fernandez that “there was blood all over defendant RADTKE’s apartment.” (Compl. ¶25.) In a dispute between neighbors that resulted in physical violence with a complaint of physical harm by the victim and support by a witness, the police were not required to walk away or risk personal liability for effecting an arrest. The plaintiffs argue that the officers should have doubted Radtke’s and his son’s allegations on the ground that Adalberto Fernandez stated that his brother had not left the plaintiffs’ apartment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has found probable cause, however, “where a police officer was presented with different stories from an alleged victim and the arrestee.” Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001). As a result, Adalberto Fernandez’s differing account of what occurred does not necessarily negate probable cause. As the Court has already explained, once a police officer has established a basis for probable cause, “he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. The plaintiffs also contend that their history of complaints against Radtke made clear that Radtke was simply retaliating against the plaintiffs by complaining to the NYPD Defendants. But the Court cannot find that the defendants should have drawn such a conclusion. Allegations of bad blood simply do not undercut Radtke’s assertion, or that of his son, that Ramon Fernandez took the dispute to a physically violent level, especially in view of the corroborating evidence of the bloody and ransacked Radtke apartment. Moreover, faced with such allegations of physical violence, it is unreasonable to suggest that the police should merely turn a blind eye. Adalberto Fernandez also alleges that he was the victim of false arrest. As the Court has explained, the existence of probable cause defeats this claim. Moreover, the elements of a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment under New York law are: “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Weyant, 101 F.3d at 853 (alteration in original) (quoting Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bernard, 25 F.3d at 102. Adalberto Fernandez cannot sustain a claim for false arrest because he has not alleged that he was actually confined or seized. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s dismissal of unlawful seizure claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) when plaintiff failed to alleged that his person was seized); Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 540- 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing false imprisonment claim when plaintiff failed to allege actual physical confinement). Adalberto Fernandez claims that he was in custody and not free to leave when Thomson confronted him in the plaintiffs’ apartment. However, the Complaint states only that officers entered his apartment stating “arrest him, arrest him” and pointing at Adalberto Fernandez. (Compl. ¶20.) There is no indication that Adalberto Fernandez was ever physically restrained in any way or told that he could not leave despite the confrontational comments by defendant Thomson. See Bower, 639 F. Supp. at 541 (“even if the conduct of [the defendants] caused [the plaintiff] to feel like a prisoner, this is not enough to sustain a cause of action for false imprisonment since [the plaintiff] has not alleged actual physical confinement”) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, the Complaint implies that the NYPD Defendants quickly thereafter focused their attention on Ramon Fernandez, whom they did, in fact, arrest, and there is no indication that the officers had any further interest in Adalberto Fernandez. To assert successfully a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights. See Murphy, 118 F.3d at 944; Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. Here, the relevant right is the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Because no such seizure occurred, that right was not violated and the claim must fail. The defendants also argue that Ramon Fernandez’s malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because his prosecution did not terminate in the plaintiff’s favor. “One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution claim is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” DiBlasio v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). The plaintiff, however, characterizes the prosecution as a failure for purposes of the malicious prosecution claim. The plaintiff notes that although he was originally charged with third degree assault and second degree harassment, the first charge was later reduced to attempted assault in the third degree before Ramon Fernandez was ultimately acquitted of the assault charge altogether by a jury. The plaintiff was, however, convicted on the original second degree harassment charge. Ramon Fernandez thus argues that the acquittal is a favorable termination notwithstanding the guilty verdict on the harassment charge and emphasizes that second degree harassment is merely a violation under New York State law. Despite Ramon Fernandez’s efforts to argue otherwise: [T]he charge on which he was convicted, namely, harassment in the second degree, is neither technical nor innocuous because it constitutes a violation and not a crime. It is a criminal charge nonetheless and the conviction, as a matter of law, precludes a determination that the underlying criminal prosecution terminated in his favor. Pugach v. Borja, 670 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (Sup. Ct. 1998). In this case, both of the charges against Ramon Fernandez originated out of the same course of conduct against Radtke. See Id. at 722 (“charges were related in the sense that they originated out of the relationship between the parties and the pattern of conduct allegedly undertaken” by the defendant). The charge for which Ramon Fernandez was acquitted was “so closely intertwined with the offense of conviction that there is also no reasonable basis to conclude that the acquittal . . . is sufficiently distinct to support a claim of malicious prosecution.” Pichardo v. New York City Police Dept., No. 98 Civ. 429, 1998 WL 812049, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1998). [2] The plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are therefore dismissed. III. The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim. To prove abuse of process the plaintiffs must show: (1) regularly issued process compelling the performance or forbearance of some prescribed act, (2) the person activating the process must have been motivated to do harm without economic or social excuse or justification, and (3) the person activating the process must be seeking some collateral advantage or corresponding detriment to the plaintiff which is outside the legitimate ends of process. Bernard, 25 F.3d at 104; see also Savino, 33 F.3d at 76. The plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support an abuse of process claim. The plaintiffs simply do not allege that the defendants sought a “collateral advantage or corresponding detriment to the plaintiff.” The Complaint is devoid of any allegation of “extortion, blackmail or retribution”, or of any intention on the part of the defendants to bring an illegitimate detriment to the plaintiffs. Reisner v. Stoller, 51 F. Supp. 2d 430, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 540 F. Supp. 706, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citation omitted). There are no allegations that the NYPD Defendants had any illegitimate collateral motive whatsoever. The claim for abuse of process is therefore dismissed. IV. The defendants argue, in the alternative, that defendant Thomson is entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A right is clearly established when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The unlawfulness must be apparent.” McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 97 (2 Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted)); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002); Funnye, 2001 WL 300740, at *8. The right not to be arrested without probable cause is a clearly established right. Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is now far too late in our constitutional history to deny that a person has a clearly established right not to be arrested without probable cause.”). The same is true of the right to be free from malicious prosecution and abuse of process. See id. at 79-80. Nevertheless, “even where the plaintiff’s federal rights and the scope of the official’s permissible conduct are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense protects a government actor if it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act.” Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, and Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)). An officer has qualified immunity for an alleged false arrest “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Posr, 180 F.3d at 416 (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)). Thompson argues that, even if there was no probable cause to arrest Ramon Fernandez, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that probable cause existed. [3] The Court must determine whether the plaintiffs could prevail if they are able to prove the facts alleged in the Complaint. Posr, 180 F.3d at 416. In this case, Thomson was informed by a putative complainant and eye witness that Ramon Fernandez had assaulted Radtke and ransacked Radtke’s apartment. There was no reason to doubt the witnesses, especially in view of the blood in Radtke’s apartment corroborating the account. Thomson had probable cause to arrest Ramon Fernandez and his actions were objectively reasonable in so doing. He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. See Savino, 331 F.3d at 75, 76 (defendants entitled to qualified immunity on false arrest claim when probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest). Moreover, under the facts as alleged, the plaintiffs do not assert a claim for abuse of process. Therefore, Thomson is entitled to qualified immunity on the abuse of process claim as well. See Savino, 331 F.3d at 78 (defendants entitled to qualified immunity on abuse of process claim where defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the claim). V. The defendants also move to dismiss the claim of municipal liability against the City. In order to impose §1983 liability upon a municipality, the plaintiffs must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). The plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injuries alleged. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404; Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. Because the Court finds that neither Ramon Fernandez nor Adalberto Fernandez suffered any constitutional injury, the Court need not reach the Monell claim. There was no constitutional violation for which the City could have been liable. VI. Because the Court is dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims under the federal constitution, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and those claims are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C §1367(c)(3); Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001); Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1992); Lieberman v. Fine, Olin & Anderman, P.C., No. 00 Civ. 6533, 2002 WL 142198, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002); Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. Bratton, 882 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y), aff’d, 52 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1995). Conclusion For the reasons explained above, the motion to dismiss the claims for a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 is granted. Because the remaining claims arise under state law and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the entire Complaint should be dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and to close this case. So Ordered. FootNotes: [1] In this case, there is no difference between the alleged false arrest and false imprisonment claims. “False arrest is simply an unlawful detention or confinement brought about by means of an arrest rather than in some other way and is in all other respects synonymous with false imprisonment.” Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1999) (Glasser, J., dissenting); see also Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 853 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing false arrest as “a species of false imprisonment”). The Court will therefore address the allegations together as a claim for false arrest. [2] Moreover, there is no reason to believe from the facts alleged in the Complaint that this is a case where the Court must be concerned that prosecutors set about “securing an indictment for an easily provable minor offense and adding to it more serious charges with the hope that proof of probable cause would insulate the prosecutor from liability for malicious prosecution on the unproved serious ones.” DiBlasio, 102 F.3d at 658; see also Bowles v. State of New York, 37 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). [3] As the Court has already explained, Adalberto Fernandez was never detained and his constitutional rights were never violated. Therefore, Officer Thomson cannot be liable to Adalberto Fernandez and it is unnecessary to reach the issue of his qualified immunity.

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