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Torts No. 01-1203, 6/26/2003. Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS: In this medical-malpractice action arising from the emergency delivery of an infant, defendant Dr. Douglas McIntyre moved for summary judgment raising the Good Samaritan statute as an affirmative defense. The Good Samaritan statute provides an affirmative defense against ordinary negligence for persons who administer emergency care, under specified circumstances. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code �74.001. However, the statute does not protect from liability persons whose services were provided “for or in expectation of remuneration.” The trial court granted the doctor’s motion for summary judgment, but a divided court of appeals reversed, holding that the doctor failed to prove conclusively that he was entitled to protection from liability under the Good Samaritan statute. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the doctor failed to prove that he was not legally entitled to receive payment for the emergency services he rendered. HOLDING: Reversed and remanded. The court agrees with the court of appeals that the burden of proof was on McIntyre to negate the exception for care provided for or in expectation of remuneration. By its terms, subsection (b)(1) applies to the entirety of �74.001, including subsection (c) under which McIntyre falls. The court disagrees with the proposition that a person must prove that he or she is not “legally” entitled to receive payment to negate the second prong of subsection (d). This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. The modifier “legally” is not found in the text of subsection (d). Indeed, a straightforward reading of subsection (d) leads to the conclusion that the adverb “ordinarily” modifies the verb “received” and the verb phrase “be entitled to receive.” Proof that McIntyre is not legally entitled to remuneration under any conceivable circumstance or theory is unnecessary. As the dissent in the court of appeals correctly observed, the court of appeals’ definition would significantly alter, rather than clarify, the language and the common sense meaning of subsection (b)(1). Thus, reading subsection (d) to require that the person seeking protection of the statute prove that he would neither ordinarily receive nor ordinarily be entitled to receive remuneration comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of subsection (d) and ensures that this section is consistent with subsection (b)(1). The court concludes that McIntyre’s summary judgment evidence conclusively established that he did not act for or in expectation of remuneration within the meaning of �74.001(b)(1) and (d). OPINION: Wainwright, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

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