MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a former middle school teacher and high school coach at Defendant Clinton Central School District (“Defendant CCSD”), commenced this action in October 2019, alleging, among other things, that she was discriminated against, suffered a hostile work environment, and was terminated after false allegations surfaced that she had romantic or sexual feelings for one of the students she coached, “K.S.” See generally Dkt. No. 1. In addition to suing Defendant CCSD, Plaintiff also named various members of Defendant CCSD’s faculty, including the superintendent, another coach, the athletic director, the middle school principal, and Defendant CCSD’s board members (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Individual Defendants”), and two attorneys for Defendant CCSD, Ms. Melinda Burdick Bowe, Esq. and Ms. Elizabeth Hoffman, Esq. (collectively referred to as the “Attorney Defendants”). See generally id. Plaintiff first amended her complaint as of right in December 2019 (hereinafter the “FAC”). See Dkt. No. 30. Defendant CCSD and the Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim,1 which the Court granted in part and denied in part, determining that Plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX claims against Defendant CCSD for gender discrimination could go forward and dismissing the remaining claims, including those against the Individual Defendants. See Dkt. Nos. 35, 43, 58. Plaintiff then moved to amend her complaint and attached a Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“PSAC”) to that motion. See Dkt. No. 44. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend her FAC with respect to her Title VII and Title IX gender discrimination claims against Defendant CCSD but denied her request with respect to her other claims. See Dkt. No. 58. Specifically, the Court ordered “that Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint [(hereinafter the "SAC")] that only contains her Title VII and Title IX claims for gender discrimination against Defendant CCSD and her claims against the Non-District Defendants [the Attorney Defendants], who have not moved to dismiss those claims, within fourteen (14) days of the filing of [the Court's] Memorandum-Decision and Order.” See id. at 30. The Court also reminded Plaintiff to “specifically identify against which Defendants she is asserting each of her claims[.]” See id. Plaintiff filed her SAC in August 2021, which contained nearly identical allegations to her PSAC but only alleged the following four causes of action: (1) Title VII gender discrimination against Defendant CCSD; (2) Title IX gender discrimination against Defendant CCSD; (3) gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Attorney Defendants; and (4) hostile work environment based on gender and perceived sexual orientation under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Attorney Defendants. See Dkt. No. 60 at
56-67. Pending before the Court are Defendant CCSD’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s SAC for failing to comport with the Court’s Order, see Dkt. No. 63, and the Attorney Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s two causes of action against them for failure to state a claim, see Dkt. No. 68. Plaintiff opposes both motions. See Dkt. Nos. 69, 71. II. DISCUSSION A. Defendant CCSD’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s SAC Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike “‘may be appropriate where a plaintiff has exceeded the scope of h[er] leave to amend.’” Starostenko v. UBS AG, No. 19 Civ. 9993 (KPF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65164, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2022) (quoting Miles v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 9302 (VSB), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130914, 2018 WL 3708657, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2018)) (other citation omitted). “District courts in this Circuit have routinely dismissed claims in amended complaints where the court granted leave to amend for a limited purpose and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint exceeding the scope of the permission granted.” Palm Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, 457 F. App’x 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (collecting cases). However, “‘[a] motion to strike is not favored and will not be granted unless it is clear that the allegation in question can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.’” Knight v. Cnty. of Cayuga, No. 5:19-CV-712, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175238, *45 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2019) (Hurd, J.) (quoting Ruggles v. Wellpoint, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 61, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). In Plaintiff’s PSAC, filed in March 2021, she sought to add various allegations related to her communications with Defendant CCSD’s employees regarding her alleged “relationship” with K.S. to her complaint. See Dkt. No. 44-2, PSAC, at
