OPINION Appellant Penny Jones (âJonesâ) and her now-deceased ex-husband, J.T. Jones (âJ.T.â) were ordered to sell their primary residence pursuant to a divorce decree. They agreed to retain Appellee Maxine Coppinger (âCoppingerâ), a licensed real estate agent, to serve as their listing agent. Although the property sold at a price agreed upon by the parties, Jones filed the present lawsuit against Coppinger, alleging that Coppinger failed to disclose certain information to her, which caused Jones to agree to a lower sales price than she otherwise would have. Jonesâs lawsuit alleged four causes of action against Coppinger, all of which were based on the claimed failure to disclose information: (1) fraud by nondisclosure; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) breach of contract; and (4) violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (âDTPAâ). The trial court granted Coppingerâs motion for summary judgment, dismissing all four causes of action, and further granted Coppingerâs request for an award of attorneyâs fees and costs pursuant to the partiesâ contract. Although we disagree with Jonesâs arguments that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment or in awarding attorneyâs fees and costs, we agree with Jones that the trial court erred in holding her attorney individually responsible for paying the award, and for stating in its order that the failure to pay the award is enforceable by contempt proceedings. We therefore strike those provisions from the attorneyâs fee order, but affirm the trial courtâs judgment in all other respects.[1] FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Listing Agreement Under the terms of their divorce decree, Jones and her then-husband, J.T. were required to liquidate various community assets, including their primary residence, located on a 169-acre tract of land in Fayette County (hereinafter the âpropertyâ). The decree required the parties to agree upon a realtor who was an active member of the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) to list the property at its fair market value no later than January 15, 2016. It further directed the parties to accept any offer on the property within 10% of the listing price. If the property was not sold within six months of the listing date, the parties were to work with the real estate agent to establish a scheduled reduction in the listing price. In addition, the decree directed the parties to use a portion of the proceeds from the sale to pay an existing IRS debt of $230,000, after which the parties were to split any remaining profit from the sale on an equal basis. It is undisputed that Jones was represented by two attorneys throughout the divorce proceedings, as well as during the ensuing real estate transaction. The parties ultimately agreed upon Coppinger, an associate broker at Heritage Texas Country Properties (hereinafter âHeritageâ), as the listing agent. Jones and J.T. thereafter signed a listing agreement with Heritage, which Coppinger signed in her capacity as the âbrokerâs associateâ and its âauthorized agent,â allowing her to list the property for $1.5 million. The agreement, which ran from March 9, 2016 to September 14, 2016, provided that Heritage was to receive a commission of 6%, to be split with the buyerâs broker, if the property was sold during that time. The listing agreement also contained a clause, requiring the parties to mediate any dispute, and a provision stating that if the âseller or broker is a prevailing partyâ in any legal dispute brought as a result of the listing or any transaction contemplated by the listing, the prevailing party would be entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees from the non-prevailing party. The Sales Agreement Although the exact date is not clear, the parties received an offer of $1.2 million on the property on or before May 31, 2016. That same day, one of Jonesâs attorneys sent an email to Coppinger and J.T.âs attorney, Katrina Packard (âPackardâ), stating that the offer was too low; he then suggested making a counter-offer of $1.235 million, with an agreement to convey 15% of the mineral interests on the property to the buyer, together with an agreement that Jones would be responsible for cleaning the property prior to the sale.[2] In suggesting this amount, Jonesâs attorney pointed out that the parties had agreed to reduce the listing price by 5% if the property did not sell within 90 days of the initial listing, which meant that the listing price would soon be reduced to $1.425 million if this sale was not completed. And in turn, he pointed out that because the divorce decree required the parties to accept any offer that was within 10% of the listing price, this meant that they would soon be required to accept an offer of $1.2825 million. And although he noted that the proposed counter-offer of $1.235 million was less than that amount, he nevertheless stated that his client was willing to accept that amount. J.T. agreed with the proposed-counter offer which was communicated to the buyer. The parties thereafter signed a sales agreement on June 3, 2016, which incorporated the terms of the counteroffer and set a closing date for June 24, 2016. The Disclosure of the 1031 Sales Exchange Information Sometime prior to June 15, 2016, Coppinger contacted the buyerâs agent and the title company to inquire if the closing date could be extended because Jones was having problems cleaning the property, as required by the sales agreement. In response, the buyerâs agent sent Coppinger an e-mail on June 15, 2016 at 8:45 a.m., stating that the buyer needed to close on June 24, 2016, as set forth in the sales contract, in order to be âin compliance with his 1031 exchange.â[3] Coppinger then sent an email to the attorneys for both parties at 11:55 a.m. that same day, explaining that the closing was âchiseled in granite,â as the buyer was executing a 1031 exchange. Jones admitted at her deposition that neither she nor her attorneys objected to the sale going forward at that time, and the closing therefore took place as scheduled on June 24, 2016, which Jones attended with one of her attorneys. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Jonesâs Original Petition Almost two years later, Jones filed her Original Petition naming Coppinger as a defendant, alleging the following four causes of action: (1) fraud by nondisclosure; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) breach of contract; and (4) violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (âthe DTPAâ). These claims were all based on the factual allegation that Coppinger knew that the buyer was using a 1031 exchange prior to June 13, 2016, and that she had a fiduciary duty and a contractual obligation to timely disclose this information during the negotiations period, but failed to do so. Jones alleged that knowing this information would have enabled her to negotiate a higher sales price, as the buyerâs use of the 1031 exchange placed him at a financial âdisadvantageâ due to his need to close the sale within a certain timeframe or risk losing the tax advantages, making it unlikely that he would have âturn[ed] downâ a higher counter-offer than the parties made. In effect, she believes that she could have pressured the buyer into paying the full fair market value of the property, which she alleged was $1.5 million, and that she therefore suffered actual damages of $132,500 (her one-half share of theorized increase in the net proceeds from the sale). In addition to seeking compensation for her actual damages, she requested mental anguish damages, as well as exemplary damages pursuant to sections 41.003 and 41.008 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code. Coppinger filed an answer denying Jonesâs allegations, and asserted a counterclaim alleging that Jones had breached the partiesâ listing agreement by not seeking mediation of the partiesâ dispute, as required by the contract. Coppinger alleged that this breach entitled her to attorneyâs fees. Coppingerâs Motion for Summary Judgment After a period for discovery, Coppinger filed a no-evidence and alternative traditional motion for summary judgment. In her motion, Coppinger alleged that she timely disclosed the information regarding the buyerâs use of the 1031 exchange on the same day that information was e-mailed to her (June 15, 2016). The motion attached the e-mail exchange and included Coppingerâs affidavit testifying that she did not know the information prior to that date. The motion argued her timely disclosure of this information negated the fraud by nondisclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims. Additionally, and with respect to the claim for fraud by nondisclosure claim, Coppinger added that Jones could not prove any injury that she suffered by the alleged failure to disclose the information. Rather, her claim that she would have been in a better negotiating posture if she had known of the information was based on mere speculation. Coppinger, however, did not challenge the damages element of any of Jonesâs remaining claims. And with respect to Jonesâs DTPA claim, Coppinger alleged that real estate professionals were exempt from the DTPA except in circumstances in which the professional made an âexpress misrepresentation,â and that Jonesâs DTPA claim should be dismissed, as Jones had not alleged that she had made any such misrepresentation. Coppinger retained her own right to seek attorneyâs fees as the prevailing party on the contract and stated her intent to later prove up the amount of those attorneyâs fees and costs. Jonesâs First Amended Petition and Her Response to the Motion In her response to the motion for summary judgment, Jones did not come forward with any evidence to rebut Coppingerâs claim that she only learned of the 1031 information on June 15, and that she disclosed it the same day. Nor did she present any additional evidence to establish her claim for damages. Instead, she attached to her motion a copy of a First Amended Petition, filed only minutes before, in which she made new factual allegations, contending that Coppinger had engaged in âimproper, unilateral conversationsâ with J.T. and Packard prior to the signing of the sales agreement. She argued these unilateral conversations supported all four of her previously- pled causes of action. Jones attached copies of these communications to her summary judgment response, all of which pertained to a potential IRS problem. On May 5, 2016, Coppinger sent to the attorneys for both parties an email inquiring about the possibility that the IRS might foreclose on the property to satisfy the tax debt the parties owed, and asking if that would affect any existing âmineral leasesâ on the property.[4] Although it is unclear whether Jonesâs attorneys also responded to the inquiry, Packard as J.T.âs attorney sent Coppinger an email on May 12, 2016, without copying Jonesâs attorney, stating that there were no mineral leases on the property at that time. However, Packard explained that if the IRS foreclosed on the property to satisfy the IRS debt, all mineral interests on the property would go to the IRS. She further informed Coppinger that the IRS was already levying on J.T.âs social security checks, but that the levy would not satisfy the IRS debt, and that the âproperty may be next.â On May 13, 2016, Coppinger replied directly to Packardâs email, without copying Jonesâs attorneys, thanking her for the response, and expressing concern that if the IRS foreclosed on the property, she would be âout of a job,â and would lose the advertising expenses she had invested in the property. She then asked Packard how long she would have to sell the property in the event of a foreclosure. Packard responded that same day, telling Coppinger that she did not know the answer, but encouraged her to continue her efforts to market the property and to bring forward all offers that she received. Jones alleged in both her First Amended Petition and in her response to Coppingerâs motion for summary judgment that during these communications, Coppinger revealed that she had an âurgencyâ to sell the property so that she would not lose her âinvestmentâ in marketing the property or potentially lose her commission. Jones alleged that Coppinger had both a fiduciary duty and a contractual obligation to disclose these communications to her, given her obligation to treat both parties on an âequalâ basis. She then posited the same theory of damages as she did with respect to Coppingerâs failure to disclose the 1031 exchange information, arguing that the failure to disclose the communications placed her in a less favorable negotiating position, and resulted in her acceptance of a sales price below the âequitable valueâ of the property. Jones summary judgment response also attached several discovery pleadings, excerpts of Coppingerâs deposition, and an unsigned and unnotarized statement from one of her attorneys who represented her during the divorce proceedings and the real estate transaction. Jones herself did not file an affidavit, nor did she attach any additional excerpts from her deposition.[5] The Trial Courtâs Judgment and the Appeal The trial court granted Coppingerâs motion, expressing concern at the hearing that Jones had not come forward with any evidence to establish that she had suffered any injury due to Coppingerâs actions. The trial court thereafter entered orders in Coppingerâs favor resolving her counterclaim for attorneyâs fees. The trial court found that Coppinger was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneyâs fees and costs pursuant to the partiesâ listing agreement, as she was the âprevailing partyâ in the litigation. After Coppingerâs attorney provided evidence of the amount of the fees and costs incurred in the litigation, the trial court issued a separate order awarding Coppinger attorneyâs fees in the amount of $22,565 and costs of $3,727.36, and further stated in its order that both Jones and her attorney were responsible for paying the award, under threat of contempt. Jones thereafter filed a motion for new trial, challenging both the trial courtâs order granting summary judgment, as well as its award of attorneyâs fees. The trial court denied Jonesâ motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. Jonesâs raises two issues on appeal, the first generally stating that the trial court erred in granting Coppingerâs motion for summary judgment. See Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (issue stating that âthe trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgmentâ allows argument as to all possible grounds upon which the summary judgment should have been denied). Under that issue, she makes several procedural challenges to Coppingerâs motion, in addition to arguing that material questions of fact remain for a jury to determine with respect to all elements of her four causes of action. Appellantâs second issue on appeal complains of the trial court granting Coppingerâs request for an award of attorneyâs fees and costs. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT Standard of Review We review a trial courtâs order granting summary judgment de novo, taking âas true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,â and âindulg[ing] every reasonable inference and resolv[ing] any doubts in the nonmovantâs favor.â Cmty. Health Sys. Profâl Services Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017) quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Further, when a motion asserts both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we first review the no-evidence grounds. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (holding that when party moves for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds, appellate courts first address no-evidence grounds). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is similar to a pre-trial motion for directed verdict. See Draughon v. Johnson, No. 20-0158, 2021 WL 2387430, at *3 (Tex. June 11, 2021), citing TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(i). The motion must state the elements as to which the movant believes there is no evidence. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(i). âA properly filed no-evidence motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion.â JLB Builders, L.L.C. v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021). â[A] no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.â King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). âMore than a scintilla of evidence exists if it would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions,â while less than a scintilla exists âwhen the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact.â King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted). Application Two common issues pervade each of Jonesâs four causes of action. The first is her liability allegation that initially claimed Coppinger failed to timely disclose the 1031 exchange. When Coppinger challenged that allegation (and presented her own affidavit denying it), Jones alleged a new and different non-disclosure theory related to discussions of an IRS lien. Jones now contends this additional theory negates the summary judgment which was premised only on an attack on the 1031 exchange theory. We ultimately need not address the liability claim, because regardless of what was allegedly not disclosed, the non-disclosures all lead back to the second common issue: Jonesâs theory of damages. The common element of damages Under each of the alleged claims, some damages must generally result from the complained of conduct. See Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Tex. 2019) (fraud by non-disclosure); First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017) (breach of fiduciary duty); USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 502 n.21 (Tex. 2018) (breach of contract). The DTPA itself imposes a requirement that a defendantâs actions were the âproducing cause of his economic damages[.]â TEX.BUS.& COM.CODE ANN. § 17.50(a). As the trial court recognized, all four of Jonesâs causes of action, as pled, contained a common theory of damages. In her First Amended Petition, Jones alleged that she could have negotiated a better price for the property (or offered a smaller share of the mineral rights) if Coppinger had not failed to disclose the 1031 exchange or IRS lien information during the negotiations period. This same question of damages is common to the claims for fraudulent non- disclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. It is also common to Jonesâs DTPA economic damage claim.[6] Jones, however, presented no evidence that any of the allegedly non- disclosed information would have raised the purchase price. First, Jones argues that if she had known of the 1031 exchange, she could have negotiated with the buyer to pressure him into paying the âequitable valueâ of the property, which she equates with the listing price of $1.5 million. However, Jones presented no summary judgment evidence to establish that the fair market value of the house was $1.5 million, or that it was in fact any higher than the price agreed upon in the sale contract. Instead, when asked at her deposition why she believed the house had a fair market value of $1.5 million, her only response was that the property was âpretty.â More importantly, there is no evidence in the record to support Jonesâs allegation that the buyer would have been willing to pay $1.5 million for the property (or take a smaller mineral interest), or that, in fact, he would have paid any more than the agreed-upon amount in the sales contract simply because he was utilizing a 1031 exchange. And faced with a higher counter-offer, the eventual buyer had three options: (1) accept the higher counter-offer; (2) make his own counter-counter-offer; or (3) walk away from the deal. Based on this record, we can only speculate which option he would have pursued. Yet, a party may not recover damages that are âtoo remote, too uncertain, or purely conjectural.â J & D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. 2016); see also Pacheco v. Rodriguez, 600 S.W.3d 401, 411 (Tex.App.âEl Paso 2020, no pet.) (same). When a plaintiffâs claim for damages is based solely on speculation or conjecture, summary judgment is appropriate. See Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 667, 674 (Tex.App.âEastland 2008, pet. denied) (affirming trial courtâs granting of summary judgment where the plaintiffâs âcausation and damages theories were fatally speculative.â); Reardon v. LightPath Techs., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 429, 439 (Tex.App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (affirming trial courtâs order granting no-evidence summary judgment where the plaintiffâs claim for damages was speculative and conjectural and plaintiff presented no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they suffered any injuries). In addition, we find that Jonesâs claim that she was damaged by the undisclosed email communications that Coppinger had with Packard about the IRS suffers from the same defect. Jones complains that the email exchange reflected that Coppinger was concerned that the IRS might foreclose on the property, which created an âurgencyâ on her part to make a âquickâ sale of the property, so that she would not lose her commission. But her theory of how she was damaged by the failure to disclosure that information is virtually identical to the alleged failure to disclose the 1031 exchange information. That is, she claims she could have negotiated a better sales price if she had known of the email exchanges. In addition to not presenting evidence that the buyer would have paid a higher sales price if negotiations had continued, she provides no explanation for how this information would affect the sales price of the property, or how it could have had any impact on the partiesâ negotiations. As Coppinger points out, the subject matter discussed in the email exchange had nothing to do with the partiesâ negotiations and was instead a discussion of a concern about which all parties to the listing agreement were aware even before negotiations began. In particular, the undisputed summary judgment evidence established that Jones was clearly aware of the IRS debt and the consequent possibility that the IRS might foreclose on the property. She testified at deposition that she was already aware of the âserious threatâ posed by the possibility of the IRS foreclosure, and the consequent need to act quickly to sell the property. And, as Coppinger points out, both Jones and J.T. had a âcommon interestâ in ensuring that the property sold before this occurred. Accordingly, Coppingerâs desire to sell the property before a foreclosure occurred was not adverse to Jonesâs interest, and instead clearly aligned with her interests. In addition, both parties were aware that Coppinger was obligated under the express terms of the listing agreement to expend funds to market the property, and that she was entitled to receive a commission for any sale that she procured. Accordingly, as Coppinger points out, Jones could have hardly been surprised to learn that Coppinger was eager to protect her investment by ensuring that the property sold before a foreclosure could take place. And finally, Jones has not alleged, must less presented any evidence to support, a finding that Coppingerâs motivation to sell the property caused Jones to agree to a price that was lower than the fair market value of the property, as it was her own attorney who suggested the price, presumably with full knowledge of the propertyâs value. We therefore conclude that Jones failed to come forward with sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a question of fact on the damage element of any of her causes of action. Jonesâs Procedural Challenges Jones, however, raises three responsive arguments she claims precludes the damages question negating all of her causes of action. Coppingerâs failure to challenge the damages element of all causes of action An overarching theme in Jonesâs appeal centers on the fact that Coppingerâs motion for summary judgment only challenged the damages element of her cause of action for fraud by nondisclosure, and that Coppinger failed to challenge the damages element of her remaining three causes of action. Jones therefore contends that the trial court erred by, in effect, granting summary judgment âsua sponteâ on elements of her remaining three causes of action that Coppinger did not challenge. Although we agree with Jones that Coppinger failed to expressly challenge the damages element of those three causes of action, we do not find this to be fatal to the summary judgment. In general, a trial court is prohibited from granting a defendantâs no-evidence summary judgment on an element of a plaintiffâs claim not challenged in the motion. See, e.g., McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist, 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993) (a motion for summary judgment âmust stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion.â). However, a limited exception to this general rule applies when a plaintiff has brought multiple causes of action against a defendant, which all have a common element or require proof of the same âultimate fact,â and when the defendant has challenged that element or ultimate fact in its motion with respect to one claim, but omits the challenge with respect to the other claims. See G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). In that instance, if the moving party prevails with respect to the common element or ultimate fact on the challenged cause of action, the âunaddressed causes of action are derivative of the addressed cause of action, the summary judgment may be affirmedâ with respect to all of the causes of action. Id., citing TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND REVIEW § 3.06[3] at 3-20 (3d ed. 2010) (collecting cases). This exception applies when the movant has conclusively proved or disproved a matter, such as an element of a claim, which would also preclude the unaddressed claim as a matter of law; it also applies âwhen the unaddressed claim is derivative of the addressed claim, and the movant proved its entitlement to summary judgment on that addressed claim.â Id., quoting Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 73 (Tex.App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). For the exception to apply, however, there must be âa very tight fit between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements the unaddressed claim, as it was alleged, required: otherwise, the exception could swallow the rule.â Id., quoting Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73; see also PAS, Inc. v. Engel, 350 S.W.3d 602, 609-10 (Tex.App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that the application of this exception requires ââa very tight fitâ between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements must be proved or disproved for the unaddressed claim[s].â).[7] This exception fits the present case. As explained above, all of Jonesâs causes of action depend on the failure to disclose the information leading to a lower sales price for the property. And since Coppinger expressly challenged the damages element of her claim for fraud by nondisclosure, and Jones in turn, failed to present any evidence to support that element, this conclusively established that she suffered no damages as the result of Coppingerâs failure to disclose the 1031 information or the email exchange with Packard. Therefore, if she could not establish damages for the challenged cause of action, she could not do so for her remaining causes of action, as pled, which rely on the same theory of recovery. Accordingly, we conclude that even if the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this unchallenged element of Jonesâs remaining claims, we must still affirm the summary judgment under this exception. See Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 297. Jonesâs newly-alleged grounds for relief Jones also argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to the new grounds for relief that she raised in her First Amended Petition. Coppinger did not, and could not, expressly challenge those grounds in a motion for summary judgment directed at the Original Petition. Jones, however, did not add new a cause of action in her First Amended Petition. Rather, she added new facts regarding Coppingerâs alleged breach of her duties that all still relied on a single theory of damagesâthat she could have negotiated a better price for the sale of the propertyâa theory for which she provided no support. Accordingly, we conclude that Coppingerâs motion for summary judgment, which expressly challenged her theory of damages, was broad enough to include the newly-raised factual allegations in her First Amended Petition. Jonesâs failure to plead for a fee forfeiture And finally, Jones also argues that her breach of fiduciary duty claim does not require a showing of actual damages such as a difference in the sales price. And indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not necessarily require a showing that the plaintiff suffered any actual damages when the remedy sought is âequitable forfeiture of an improper benefit received by the agent,â rather than damages for economic losses suffered by the plaintiff. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 221 (Tex. 2017) (breach of fiduciary duty claim could be based only on âdisgorgement of all fees, financial benefits, profits, and any other remuneration derivedâ from the defendantâs wrongful acts); Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 512 (1942) (fiduciary duty claim against agent who obtained a secret commission when plaintiff did not suffer any damages); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232, 239-40 (Tex. 1999) (affirming court of appeals finding that plaintiffs had a valid cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty for attorneysâ alleged wrongful conduct, in the absence of actual damages, where plaintiffs sought a forfeiture of all fees the attorneys received). But the problem with this argument is that Jones did not request a fee forfeiture in any of her pleadings. Jonesâs First Amended Petition did not request divestiture of Coppingerâs commission. To the contrary, she expressly stated that she was seeking actual economic damages and exemplary damages as the result of Coppingerâs alleged breach. Nor did she request such relief in her general prayer for damages. Accordingly, her petition did not in fact indicate that she was seeking a disgorgement of Coppingerâs commission. Jones, however, contends that she brought this issue to the trial courtâs attention in her response to Coppingerâs Motion for Summary Judgment by contending the commissions were part of her damage model for her breach of fiduciary duty claim. A closer look at her response, however, reveals that Jones only alleged that Coppinger âbenefitedâ from her conduct by âsecuring the Property sale, recouping [her] âinvestment,â and making a substantial commission on the Property sale.â But again, she did not inform the trial court in her response that she was seeking to have Coppingerâs commission disgorged as a result thereof. Nor did she request permission from the trial court to amend her petition to add that prayer for relief. Jones came closer to raising this issue through her motion for new trial by citing general case law for the proposition that âother courts have found that even if the plaintiff sustains no loss from the defendantâs breach of fiduciary duty, the defendant cannot retain the benefits it acquired from the breach,â and that âthese fact issues should be submitted to a jury.â However, even if we were to conclude that this argument sufficiently informed the trial court that Jones was seeking a fee forfeiture, this argument came too late in the proceedings to avoid a waiver. As the Texas Supreme Court has recognized, when a party fails to bring an issue or argument to the trial courtâs attention in a written response in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the parties waive the right to raise the arguments or issues post-judgment. See Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797-98 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c) (âIssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.â). Accordingly, because Jones failed to raise the issue of a fee forfeiture as an alternative ground for relief at any time prior to the entry of summary judgment, she has not preserved this issue for appeal. Id.; see also Paul v. Merrill Lynch Trust Co. of Texas, 183 S.W.3d 805, 812, n.11 (Tex.App.âWaco 2005, no pet.) (where party only sought actual damages for a defendantâs alleged breach of his fiduciary duties, he could not complain on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to grant equitable relief, such as the imposition of a constructive trust on property). Having found that Jones failed to come forward with sufficient summary judgment evidence to support any of her damages claim for the four causes of action, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on all four causes.[8] Jonesâs Issue One is overruled. ATTORNEYâS FEES We next address Jonesâs argument that the trial court erred in awarding attorneyâs fees and costs to Jones. Background As set forth above, Coppinger initially sought attorneyâs fees and costs in her counterclaim to Jonesâs Original Petition, arguing that Jones had breached the partiesâ listing agreement by not seeking mediation of the partiesâ dispute. However, in her motion for summary judgment, Coppinger stated that she was seeking attorneyâs fees and costs pursuant to the attorney fee provision in the partiesâ listing agreement, which provided that if the seller or broker is a âprevailing partyâ in any legal dispute arising from or related to the agreement, the prevailing party would be entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees from the ânon-prevailing party.â And after the trial court announced at the summary judgment hearing that it was granting summary judgment in Coppingerâs favor, the parties agreed that the trial court could consider Coppingerâs request for attorneyâs fees and costs by submission, without the need for a hearing. Coppingerâs attorney thereafter submitted a request for an award of attorneyâs fees and costs, arguing among other things that she was the âprevailing partyâ in the litigation and that she was therefore entitled to an award under the terms of the partiesâ listing agreement. Coppingerâs attorney attached an affidavit, detailing the actions he took in the case, and averring that his attorneyâs fees totaled $22,565 and that he had incurred costs of $3,727.36.[9] Jones responded that the attorneyâs fees clause in the contract only applied to legal disputes between the âbrokerâ and the seller, and that Coppinger was not the broker. Jones also objected to Coppingerâs proposed order, which provided that both Jones and her attorney were responsible for paying the award, contending that there was no legal basis for making her attorney responsible. The trial court, however, disagreed with Jones, and issued an order awarding the full amount of attorneyâs fees and costs requested, expressly finding that the partiesâ listing agreement permitted such an award, and that both Jones and her attorney were responsible for paying the award. In addition, the trial court included a warning in its order, stating that the failure to pay the award of attorneyâs fees âmay result in a finding of contempt of court.â Whether Coppinger Could be Considered a Prevailing Party Under the Contract In her first challenge to the trial courtâs award, Jones argues that the trial court erred in finding that Coppinger was a prevailing party under the attorney fee provision in the listing agreement, arguing, as she did in the trial court, that the provision only applied to disputes between a âbrokerâ and a seller, and that Heritage, and not Coppinger, was named as the broker in the listing agreement. Coppinger, acknowledges that she is not a licensed broker, but points out that the partiesâ contract clearly stated that Coppinger was the brokerâs associate as well as its âauthorized agent,â and that she signed the listing agreement in that capacity. Moreover, Coppinger had no authority to sign the agreement except in her capacity as the brokerâs agent. The Occupations Code defines a broker, in part, as a person who in exchange for a commission sells real estate, or procures or assists in procuring a prospect to effect the sale or exchange of real estate, or a person who is employed by or for an owner of real estate to sell any portion of the real estate TEX.OCC.CODE ANN. §§ 1101.002 (1)(A)(i)(viii); 1101.002(1)(B)(i). The Code further provides that a person must be licensed by the State to serve as a broker for another person; however, the Code allows a licensed sales agent, such as Coppinger, to engage in real estate brokerage if the person is âsponsored by a licensed broker and is acting for that broker.â TEX.OCC.CODE ANN. § 1101.351(c); see also TEX.OCC.CODE ANN. § 1101.002 (7). (âSales agentâ means a person who is sponsored by a licensed broker for the purpose of performing an act described by subdivision (1)). Accordingly, it is clear that Coppinger was acting on the brokerâs behalf in signing the listing agreement. The listing agreement repeatedly refers to the duties and responsibilities that the âbrokerâ has to the seller, as well as the brokerâs authority and the brokerâs right to receive compensation in the form of a commission. However, throughout the trial court proceedings, Jones treated Coppinger as the âbrokerâ with regard to the partiesâ listing agreement, alleging that Jones breached both her express and implied duties under the contract. Jones therefore clearly believed that Coppinger could be considered the âbrokerâ under the terms of the partiesâ agreement for purposes of having breached the agreement, and it is therefore contradictory for her to now claim that Coppinger is not a âbrokerâ for purposes of the attorney fee provision in that same agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly awarded reasonable attorneyâs fees and costs to Coppinger as the âprevailing partyâ under this contractual provision. Whether the Trial Court Properly Held Jonesâs Attorney Liable to Pay the Award Jones next argues, as she did in the trial court, that the trial court had no legal basis for holding her attorney responsible for paying the award. And, as Jones points out, Coppinger did not address that issue in her brief, and she has not directed us to any legal authority to support holding Jonesâs attorney responsible for paying the award, nor are we aware of any. The contractual provision under which the trial court issued the award governs the âprevailing partyâ and ânon-prevailing party,â but not those partiesâ attorneyâs. Moreover, we know of no other statute or rule that would authorize the trial court to impose this liability on Jonesâs attorney. In general, an attorney is not liable to an opposing party for actions taken in connection with representing a client. See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). Therefore, absent a statute or rule imposing liability on opposing counsel, a trial court does not have the authority to hold a partyâs attorney responsible for paying an award of attorneyâs fees and costs imposed against a client. Id.; see also Envision Realty Group, LLC v. Chuan Chen, No. 05-18-00613-CV, 2020 WL 1060698 (Tex.App.âDallas Mar. 5, 2020, no pet) (mem. op.) (recognizing that although Rule 91a.7 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to award costs and attorneyâs fees to a âprevailing party,â the rule does not authorize the imposition of such an award against the opposing partyâs attorney); Robinson v. Garcia, 398 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex.App.âCorpus Christi 2012, pet. denied) (where statute did not expressly state that attorneyâs fees could be awarded against a partyâs attorney, trial court had no authority to order partyâs attorney to pay the award). There are of course specific rules that permit a trial court to impose an award of attorneyâs fees against a party, the partyâs attorney, or both as a sanction for misconduct in litigation. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 13 (signing of pleadings); TEX.R.CIV.P. 215 (failure to obey various discovery orders); TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM.CODE ANN. § 10.004 (signing frivolous pleading or motion); see also Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 482 (recognizing that various mechanisms are in place to discourage and remedy an attorneyâs wrongful conduct, âsuch as sanctions, contempt, and attorney disciplinary proceedingsâ). However, the trial courtâs award was not made pursuant to any of these sanction provisions.[10] Accordingly, we agree with Jones that there is no legal basis for the trial courtâs order holding her attorney liable for paying the award of attorneyâs fees and costs. We therefore conclude that this portion of the trial courtâs order is void and must be stricken from the order. Whether the Trial Court Properly Included a Contempt Warning in the Order And finally, Jones argues that the trial court erred by including language in its order stating that a failure to pay the award âmay result in a finding of contempt of Court,â contending that the trial court had no legal grounds for including such a warning in its order. We agree with this argument as well. Although a trial court may generally enforce its order through contempt proceedings, it is well-established that Texas law does not allow contempt proceedings to be used to collect attorneyâs fees. See, e.g., Wallace v. Briggs, 348 S.W.2d 523, 525-26 (1961) (orig. proceeding) (holding that even when an award of attorneyâs fees is included as part of a final judgment, âthere is no authority for the judge to summarily order them paid or attempt to enforce that order by contempt proceedings.â); Ex parte Roan, 887 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.App.âDallas 1994, no writ) (âOur law does not allow collection of attorneyâs fees by contempt proceedings.â); In re Smith, No. 04-02-00360-CV, 2003 WL 1191408, at *2-3 (Tex.App.âSan Antonio Mar. 12, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that although attorneyâs fees âmay be enforced by other legal processes, such as execution or attachment of property,â but not by contempt). This is so because an award of attorneyâs fees is considered a debt, and under the Texas Constitution, no person may be imprisoned for a debt.[11] See Tracy v. Tracy, 219 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex.App.âDallas 2007, no pet.), citing TEX.CONST. ART. I, § 18 (â[n]o person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.â); see also In re Bielefeld, 143 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex.App.âFort Worth 2004, no pet.) (same). We therefore hold that this portion of the trial courtâs order is void and strike it from the judgment. Jonesâs Issue Two is sustained in part and overruled in part as set forth above. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial courtâs order granting summary judgment dismissing all four of Jonesâs causes of action. We further affirm the trial courtâs order awarding reasonable attorneyâs fees and costs to Coppinger, but strike the provision in the order holding Jonesâs attorney liable for paying the award, as well as the contempt language contained therein. JEFF ALLEY, Justice August 31, 2021 Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.