MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Joseph Speyer (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, initiated an action in the Supreme Court, County of Westchester, against DeCicco Family Markets, Inc., Rosa Zuniga, Jim Capriotti, and Christina DeCicco (collectively “Defendants”) on July 15, 2020. (Doc. 3-1, “Compl.”).1 Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a breach of contract claim related to Defendants’ alleged breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) and seeks to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the CBA to address his grievances. (Id.). On August 17, 2020, Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 3). Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (Doc. 15; Doc. 17, “Defs. Br.”). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §185 (“Section 301″) and/or that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to Section 301. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. ANALYSIS Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts only a breach of contract claim related to Defendants’ alleged breach of the CBA, and there is not diversity among the parties. Thus, ordinarily, in the absence of a federal question or diversity among the parties, this Court would not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. See Whitehurst v. 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers E., 928 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 2019). However, under the “complete preemption doctrine,” the Supreme Court has identified certain statutes that have “preemptive force” and act to “convert[] an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim.” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005)). One such statute is Section 301 of the LMRA, which provides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. §185(a). Section 301 preemption ensures uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and covers “claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Whitehurst, 928 F.3d at 206 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394). “Thus, when resolution of a state law claim is ‘substantially dependent’ upon or ‘inextricably intertwined’ with analysis of the terms of a CBA, the state law claim ‘must either be treated as a §301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.’” Id. at 206-07 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 220 (1985)). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by federal law, and finds further, if Plaintiff’s claims are interpreted as Section 301 claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, regarding preemption, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have breached the CBA and specifically alleges violations related to (1) “Non-Payment for Transfer to other stores,” (2) “Non-Payment for hours worked,” and (3) “Loss [sic] wages for misleading about training.” (Compl.). These allegations are directly related to rights created by the CBA and are governed by express terms of the CBA.3 (See Doc. 16-1, “CBA” Art. 26 (“In the event any employee is transferred from one (1) store to another store, the Employer shall reimburse him for the additional fares, tolls and gasoline costs resulting from such transfer….”); id. Art. 5 (addressing “hours of work”); id. Art. 6 (addressing “wages”)). Thus, because Plaintiff’s claims are directly related to the terms of the CBA and/or are dependent upon analysis of the CBA, the Court will not permit Plaintiff’s common-law contract claims to proceed as pre-empted by Section 301; and will only consider the claims under Section 301. The Court finds further that even if Plaintiff’s claims were construed as pure or hybrid claims brought pursuant to Section 301, dismissal is appropriate. First, if Plaintiff’s claims were interpreted as a pure Section 301 claim — i.e. a claim asserted against his employer only — Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as is required to state a pure Section 301 claim. Puchalski v. FM Constr., Inc., No. 18-CV-1596, 2020 WL 6727777, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (“Before bringing a pure [section] 301 claim, a party must exhaust the grievance process required by the CBA.” (quoting Allen v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2013))). The CBA requires that Plaintiff attempt to resolve his grievances through arbitration. (CBA Art. 27(c) (“The sole remedy for any breach or threatened breach of this Agreement shall be arbitration as provided. Resort shall not be made to courts or government agencies except to compel arbitration or to enforce the arbitration award.”)). There is no indication that Plaintiff attempted to resolve his grievances through arbitration before commencing this action. In fact, in Plaintiff’s Complaint, he explicitly sought to compel arbitration, which indicates that Plaintiff’s grievances were not previously raised through the arbitration process. Second, if Plaintiff’s claims were construed as a hybrid Section 301 claim — i.e. a claim that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation to the union member — Plaintiff “must allege violations on the part of both” the employer and the union. White v. White Rose Food, a Div. of DiGiorgio Corp., 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any allegation of wrongdoing against the union or any indication that Plaintiff has interacted with the union about his grievances in any way. Accordingly, even if the Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as claims brought pursuant to Section 301, dismissal is warranted. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. While “[d]istrict courts should frequently provide leave to amend before dismissing a pro se complaint…leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile.” Reed v. Friedman Mgt. Corp., 541 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). Here, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as any amendment would be futile.4 The Court respectfully directs the clerk to terminate the pending motion (Doc. 15) as well as the other letter motions pending on the docket (Docs. 13, 18) and to terminate the action. Additionally, the Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff at the address provided on the docket. SO ORDERED: Dated: January 11, 2021
