MEMORANDUM & ORDER Defendant Baimadajie Angwang is charged with acting as an agent of a foreign government in violation of 18 U.S.C. §951; wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1343; making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001; and obstructing an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512(c). The government appeals Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom’s order of pre-trial release. For the reasons stated below, the Court orders Defendant detained pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3142(e). I. Background Mr. Angwang, a New York City police officer, is charged with acting as an unregistered agent of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The charges arise from his repeated contacts with officials at the PRC’s Manhattan consulate. According to the Complaint, the Defendant began by 2018 (at the latest) reporting to PRC officials on the activities of ethnic Tibetans in America. Among other things, Mr. Angwang is alleged to have: offered assessments of ethnic Tibetans residing here who might be willing to serve as intelligence sources for the PRC; reported on Tibetans who had connections to New York State legislators, and might be disparaging the PRC; offered to provide non-public information on the internal operations of the NYPD; taken direction from PRC officials on whether to engage in certain public-relations activities in his NYPD capacity; and advised the officials on ways to expand the PRC’s so-called “soft power” in New York. FBI agents arrested Mr. Angwang on September 21, 2020. He was arraigned that day and detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn. On October 1, 2020, Defendant moved for pre-trial release. The government opposed the motion, contending that he posed a serious risk of flight. Following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Bloom ordered Defendant released to home confinement (with electronic location monitoring) on a $1 million bond (co-signed by nine suretors) and subject to additional conditions. See Order Setting Conditions of Release dated Oct. 2, 2020. At the government’s request, Judge Bloom stayed the release order pending the government’s appeal. This Court heard Defendant’s appeal later that day and reserved judgment, continuing the stay in effect pending supplemental submissions from both parties. For the reasons explained below, this Court now finds that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of” Defendant as required under 18 U.S.C. §3142(e). Accordingly, the Court reverses the release order and instead orders Defendant detained pending trial. II. Discussion District courts review de novo an order issued by a magistrate judge on bond. See United States v. Minnici, 128 F. App’x 827, 828 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). To establish that pre-trial detention is warranted, the government must make two showings: “[f]irst, it must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, if released, presents an actual risk of flight”; second, it “must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court.” United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007). In determining whether the Defendant poses a risk of flight, the Court is required to consider the factors set out in Section 3142(g), including the nature and circumstances of the charged offense; the weight of the evidence against the Defendant; and the Defendant’s history and characteristics. A. Nature and Circumstances of the Charged Offense The charge that Defendant acted as an “agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General,” 18 U.S.C. §951(a), is serious by any measure. And certain aspects of this case make it more so: the secrecy and the covert reporting on fellow citizens; the Defendant’s position of trust within the NYPD; and the allegation that he allowed his PRC “handlers” to guide him in his official duties. The parties dispute the significance of many of the specific wiretapped conversations excerpted in the Complaint. But at bottom, the Defendant is alleged to have collected information on the sentiments, attachments, and allegiances of residents of this country, and reported such information to agents of a foreign power — the nation’s most prominent geopolitical rival. He did so while professing “100 percent” loyalty to the PRC’s cause and urging his alleged handler to let Beijing know that “you have recruited one in the police department.” Complaint
15, 18, 22. Defendant’s counsel downplays the seriousness of the allegations, noting that Mr. Angwang is not accused of divulging classified information. But that assertion merely explains why the Defendant is not charged with such disclosure (cf., e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§794, 798). It should go without saying that a law enforcement officer’s decision to act on behalf of a foreign government, and in so doing to inform on the activities of fellow citizens, can have serious repercussions even absent the passing of state secrets. Moreover, the conversations intercepted by the government show the Defendant planning on at least one occasion to continue his conversation with the PRC official “the next time we meet.” Complaint 15. This suggests that certain aspects of their conversations remain, for the moment at least, outside the documented record. Defense counsel argues further that Mr. Angwang may have acted on an understandable impulse: he wanted to visit his family in China, and his ability to do so depended on the good will of the PRC consulate. Specifically, Defendant is said to have sought a ten-year visa (as opposed to a shorter travel authorization) — a privilege that his handlers had the authority to ensure that he was granted or denied. But even if this is true, it goes merely to Defendant’s motive, and not to the seriousness of his conduct. “When the sentence…upon conviction is likely to be long…a defendant has stronger motives to flee.” United States v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (cleaned up). For his alleged conduct, Defendant faces a cumulative statutory maximum of fifty-five years if convicted on all counts. There is no section of the Sentencing Guidelines that is expressly applicable to offenses under 18 U.S.C. §951. Nonetheless, the government has made a compelling case that Defendant would be likely to face at least a multi-year sentence if convicted. In its supplemental submission, the government identified fourteen cases involving violations of Section 951, with sentences ranging from eighteen to 120 months in length. For example, the defendant in United States v. Latchin received a forty-eight month sentence for immigrating to America as a “plant” for Iraqi intelligence, despite there being no indication that he provided any meaningful information once he got here. See No. 04-CR-00661 (N.D. Ill.), ECF Nos. 139, 239. The defendant in United States v. Buryakov was sentenced to thirty months for serving as an undercover Russian agent who reported on various subjects of interest (mostly economic), having met regularly with other agents in New York City and elsewhere. See No. 15-CR-00073 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF Nos. 1, 118, 157. At the lower end of the spectrum, the defendant in United States v. Butina was sentenced to eighteen months (even after cooperating with the government) for cultivating relationships that Russian officials could use to gain influence in the United States. See No. 18-CR-00218 (D.D.C.), ECF Nos. 1, 123. Similarly, in United States v. Soueid, the defendant was sentenced to eighteen months for collecting tapes of anti-Syrian protestors and sending them to Syrian officials, among other things. See 11-CR-00494 (E.D. Va.), ECF Nos. 1, 66. These sentences are all of meaningful duration, and unlike Mr. Angwang, none of the listed defendants served in a United States law enforcement capacity. Accordingly, the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor of detention.1 B. The Weight of the Evidence The weight of the evidence against the Defendant appears to be very strong, based on the government’s interception of multiple telephone conversations between Defendant and PRC officials. This factor must be weighed with caution, inasmuch as the American legal system imposes no punishment for crimes prior to conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). At this early stage in the proceedings, the Court reaches no conclusions about the merits of the government’s case. But the existence of concrete evidence — like intercepted telephone recordings — may weigh against release when it sheds light on a defendant’s role in an alleged crime. See, e.g., United States v. Fishenko, No. 12-CR-626, 2013 WL 3934174, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) (evidence of “hundreds of pertinent recorded conversations and email exchanges that reveal [the defendant's] role in the conspiracy” weighed against release). Here, the government has identified over a hundred electronic communications Defendant made to the two PRC officials, reaching back to 2014. Those conversations suggest that Defendant strategized with the two officials to expand the PRC’s influence in New York, and that he took instruction from those officials. Indeed, in several of the recorded conversations, Defendant appears to describe himself as one who has “agree[d] to operate within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official” as criminalized by Section 951(d). See, e.g., Complaint
