Rickman, Judge. Following the dismissal of Charlene Denney’s[1]case for want of prosecution for failing to appear at oral argument on Jason Crenshaw’s motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for summary judgment, she appeals. On appeal, Denney contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her case due to her counsel’s failure to appear. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment. This is not the first appearance of this case in this Court. In a prior appeal, we granted Crenshaw’s application for interlocutory review of the denial of his initial motion for summary judgment on official immunity grounds. After this Court reviewed the entire record, however, it “determined that the law and evidence adduced authorized the findings and conclusions made in support of the trial court’s decision” and dismissed the appeal. See Crenshaw v. Denny et al., (Case No. A17A1527, decided December 29, 2017). Following the remittitur, Crenshaw filed a motion for reconsideration again raising an official immunity defense. It appears from Crenshaw’s motion that a new trial court judge had been assigned to the case, and Crenshaw stated in his motion “it is important for the [c]ourt to come to its own independent conclusion rather than simply relying on and adopting [the previous judge's] order.” Denney filed two written responses to Crenshaw’s motion. Notwithstanding Denney’s written opposition to Crenshaw’s repetitive motion, after Crenshaw moved to dismiss the case, the trial court granted the request for dismissal for want of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) when Denney’s counsel failed to attend oral argument on the motion. The next day, Denney filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s grant of Crenshaw’s motion to dismiss, explaining that her counsel only became aware that he missed the scheduled hearing upon receiving the email notification of the dismissal order. Specifically, Denney’s counsel claimed that he missed the hearing because it had “not been entered on [his] calender after receipt of the . . . rule nisi,” which was a first-time occurrence in his 38 years of practice. Nevertheless, the trial court denied Denney’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. Denney appeals and contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her case due to her counsel’s failure to appear at oral argument on Crenshaw’s motion for reconsideration of his motion for summary judgment. We review a grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) for an abuse of discretion. See Wallace v. Laughlin, 217 Ga. App. 444, 445 (2) (459 SE2d 556) (1995). OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) provides that “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with . . . any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.” There are no Georgia appellate decisions holding that a plaintiff’s case can be dismissed for want of prosecution for failure to appear at oral argument on a defendant’s motion. We have previously held that dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) was appropriate when the plaintiff failed to appear at a calendar call and a pretrial conference. See Atlanta Bus. Video v. FanTrace, 324 Ga. App. 559, 561-563 (751 SE2d 169) (2013); Peachtree Winfrey Assocs. v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 197 Ga. App. 226, 226 (398 SE2d 253) (1990). These types of proceedings are distinguishable from oral argument on an opposing party’s motion for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to the Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, all motions in civil actions, including those for summary judgment, shall be decided by the court without oral hearing, except motions for new trial and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” When considering an initial motion for summary judgment, oral argument “shall be permitted upon written request made in a separate pleading bearing the caption of the case and entitled ‘Request for Oral Hearing,’ and provided that such pleading is filed with the motion for summary judgment or filed not later than five (5) days after the time for response.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3. “Under this rule, whether oral argument is heard is within the power of the parties, and is not left to the discretion of the trial court. All a party need do is make a written request for oral argument and it shall be held.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Southern Empire Homes, Inc. v. Ognio Grading, 277 Ga. App. 215, 216 (626 SE2d 173) (2006). Neither party requested oral argument on Crenshaw’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the trial court could have decided the motion without oral hearing. Because the record in this case shows that the failure to appear occurred at oral argument on an opposing party’s motion to reconsider a motion for summary judgment that had already been litigated, Denney had filed two written responses to the motion, neither party requested oral argument, and Denney diligently prosecuted the case prior to the oral argument at issue, the trial court abused its direction in dismissing this case pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). See generally Wallace v. Laughlin, 217 Ga. App. at 445 (2); Massengale v. Moore, 194 Ga. App. 328, 329 (2) (390 SE2d 439) (1990). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Denney’s case.[2] Judgment reversed. Brown, J., concurs, and Dillard, P. J. dissents.* *THIS OPINION IS PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY. COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2(a). In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
