The defendant is charged by way of a misdemeanor information with seven (7) counts of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree in violation of Penal Law §170.20; as well as by simplified traffic information with Unregistered Motor Vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §401(1)(a); Improper Plates in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §402(4); Uninspected Motor Vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §306(b); Operating Without Insurance in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §319(1); and Lights Too Strong in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §375(2)(c). A Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing was granted.At the suppression hearing on May 6, 2019, the People called as its sole witness Police Officer Moculski of the Mount Vernon Police Department. The defendant did not present any evidence. The Court heard oral arguments from the parties and allowed them to submit posthearing memorandums.Officer Moculski testified that on December 5, 2018, at approximately 1:44 p.m., while on duty in his marked patrol vehicle, he was traveling southbound in the vicinity of 208 South Fulton Avenue in the City of Mount Vernon, Westchester County, when he observed a black Toyota Corolla traveling northbound on South Fulton Avenue with a “light bar” in front of the vehicle that was sparkling, and very bright. Officer Moculski stated that because it is illegal to have the light bar on, he decided to follow the vehicle and then noticed the vehicle had a Texas temporary tag on the back of the vehicle where the license plate would be. He further testified that he is aware of many vehicles being driven in the city of Mt. Vernon with fictitious Texas and New Jersey temporary tags. While it was the very bright light bar which directed his attention to the vehicle, Officer Moculski testified that the purpose of the traffic stop was to see the validity of the temporary Texas tag.After conducting the traffic stop and inquiring of the defendant about the temporary tag, Officer Moculski conducted an e-Justice search from his mobile computer, and it came back unregistered in Texas and New York. Officer Moculski also testified that he ran the Vehicle Identification Number of the car and it also showed it was not registered in New York or Texas. Defendant when confronted with the information that the tag was not registered, allegedly admitted to Officer Moculski that he bought the temporary Texas tag in the Bronx from a friend.Upon learning that the temporary Texas tag was invalid, Officer Moculski testified that he asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest. After placing the defendant in the back of his patrol car, he testified that “we searched the vehicle due to it being impounded, because it was part of the crime.” Later in his testimony on direct examination, the officer gave two additional legal reasons for searching the defendant’s vehicle, that being for officer safety and search incident to arrest.As a result of the search, Officer Moculski recovered four additional Texas temporary tags in the glove compartment, and one in the trunk. Officer Moculski testified that the defendant “told us one was in the trunk. So, we searched the trunk first, and there was one in the trunk. And there was — he handed me…I think it was four or more from the glove box.”Where a defendant challenges the legality of a search and seizure, along with statements allegedly obtained as a result thereof, the People have the burden of going forward, in the first instance, to establish the legality of the police conduct (People v. Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86 [1986]; People v. Wise, 46 NY2d 321 [1978]). Once the prosecution has met its burden, the defendant has the ultimate burden of establishing the illegality of the police conduct, by a fair preponderance of the evidence (People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]; People v. DiStefano, 38 NY2d 640 [1976]). Additionally, the People have the burden of proving the voluntariness of any statements allegedly made beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Valeruis, 31 NY2d 51 [1972]; People v. Anderson, 42 NY2d [1977]).The stopping of a moving vehicle, however brief, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, People v. Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982 (1995); People v. May, 81 NY2d 725 (1992); People v. Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 (1978). “[S]o long as some articulable basis exists for that interference, police stops of automobiles are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or the occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime.” People v. Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753 (1995). “For a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer’s action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance.” People v. Banks, 85 NY2d 558, 562 (1995), cert denied 516 U.S. 868 (1995); see also, People v. May, 52 AD3d 147, 151 (1st Dept. 2008).The police are also authorized to stop a motor vehicle without a warrant if there exists probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has been committed, irrespective of whether the primary motivation of the police is to conduct a separate investigation (People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001]; People v. Webb, 291 AD2d 319 [1st Dept. 2002]).In order to establish the validity of the initial vehicle stop, the People relied solely upon the testimony of Officer Moculski, who testified that he observed the defendant driving his vehicle which contained a light bar in front of the vehicle which was brighter than legally permitted, namely 32 candle power. The officer testified that based on his knowledge of vehicles and training as a police officer he knew this light bar was too bright to be used in everyday driving. The officer also testified that, although he did not know how many candle strengths the defendant’s light bar was, based on his training and experience, it looked much brighter than the 32 candle strength that the law allowed on a vehicle and thus in violation of VTL §375(2)(c).Observing a person operating a motor vehicle with excessive bright lights from a light bar is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which justifies the stop of the automobile by the police. When Officer Moculski initially approached defendant, he lacked probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in any illegal activity more serious than a traffic infraction. Probable cause to arrest the defendant for the crime of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree did not arise until after the e-Justice search revealed that the temporary Texas tag on the vehicle was fraudulent, and the officer determined that the insurance card was invalid. The issue now is whether the recovery of the additional temporary Texas tags, and the statements made by the defendant were lawfully obtained.On direct examination Officer Moculski testified that after learning that the Texas temp tag was invalid, he informed the defendant of his finding and the defendant told him that he purchased the temporary tag in the Bronx from a friend. Officer Moculski also testified that the defendant handed him four or five additional temporary tags from the glove box and informed Officer Moculski that he had an additional temporary tag in the trunk. He then asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle, placed him under arrest, put him in the back of his police vehicle, and then searched the vehicle due to it being impounded, because it was part of the crime. He also stated on direct examination that he searched the vehicle pursuant to the arrest for officer safety. As a result of the search, Officer Moculski stated that he found a Texas temp tag in the trunk.Initially, this Court finds that the People failed to submit any evidence that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standardized or established police agency procedure and, thus, it cannot be said that the temporary Texas tag found in the trunk was recovered pursuant to a permissible inventory search (see People v. Johnson, 1 NY3d 252, 256 [2003]; cf. People v. Washington, 233 AD2d 684, 686 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 [1997]). Furthermore, absent any indication that a weapon was located within the vehicle which would present an actual and specific danger to the officer’s safety, the search of the vehicle could not be justified on security grounds once the driver exited the vehicle (People v. Carvey, 89 NY2d 707, 711 [1997]; People v. Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 231 n 4 [1989]; see People v. Hackett, 47 AD3d 1122, 1124 [2008]). Nevertheless, it is well settled that “when the occupant of an automobile is arrested, the very circumstances that supply probable cause for the arrest may also give the police probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, evidence of the crime, a weapon or some means of escape” (People v. Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678 [1989]). Moreover, “there is no inflexible requirement that the search concern only items relating to crimes for which the defendant is formally arrested…[T]he proper inquiry…is simply whether the circumstances gave the officer probable cause to search the vehicle” (id. at 680-681; see People v. Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]).Here, in response to questions from the arresting officer regarding the legitimacy of the temporary Texas tag on the vehicle, the defendant allegedly handed the arresting officer four additional temporary tags from the glove compartment, and informed the officer that he also had one in the trunk. Under these circumstances, the search of the trunk was justified since the officer had probable cause to believe that an additional fake temporary Texas tag was in the trunk in violation of Penal Law §170.20.As to the Huntley issues raised at the hearing, contrary to the defendant’s contention, Officer Moculski’s questioning of the defendant before his arrest, where he made statements admitting to purchasing the temporary Texas tag from a friend in the Bronx, and admitting that an additional temporary Texas tag was in the trunk of his vehicle, were investigatory in nature and asked after a valid stop of the defendant. A temporary roadside detention for the investigation of traffic-related matters are generally non-custodial in nature and encompass limited questioning appropriate to such investigations without the necessity of the rendering and waiver of the Miranda warnings (see, People v. Mackenzie, 9 Misc 3d 129(A), (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005); see also, People v. Gutierrez, 13 AD3d 268 (1st Dept. 2004); People v. Parris, 26 AD3d 393 (2d Dept. 2006); People v. Myers, 1 AD3d 382 (2d Dept. 2003); People v. Hasenflue, 52 AD2d 829 (3d Dept. 1998); People v. Mathis, 136 AD2d 746 (2d Dept. 1988). Here, the question posed by Officer Moculski was investigatory in nature and asked after a valid traffic stop. Consequently, defendant’s statements that he purchased the tag from a friend, and had an additional temporary tag in the trunk, were made voluntarily and are admissible at trial.Accordingly, defendant’s motion is denied in its entirety.This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.Dated: May 21, 2019Mount Vernon, New York
