The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 were read on this motion to/for STAYDECISION AND ORDER The motion to vacate a default judgment and stay the sale of the subject property is granted.BackgroundThis action arises out of invoices for fuel oil sent by plaintiff. Defendant is a housing development fund corporation (an HDFC) that runs the building located at 938 St. Nicholas Avenue, New York, NY. The complaint alleges that the last payment for oil was received on February 21, 2014 and $48,276.86 is owed by defendant.Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant totaling $63,549.83 on July 19, 2016 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15). Defendant now moves to inter alia vacate that default judgment, to stay a sale of the property and to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.DiscussionCPLR 317 “states, in part, that ‘[a] person served with a summons other than by personal delivery to him or to his agent for service under CPLR 318 may be allowed to defend the action within one year after he obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment upon a finding of the court that he did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense.’ As has been emphasized in numerous cases, there is no necessity for a defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 to show a reasonable excuse for its delay. It is also well established that service on a corporation through delivery of process to the Secretary of State is not personal delivery to the corporation or to an agent designated under CPLR 318. Thus, corporate defendants served under Business Corporation Law §306 have frequently obtained relief from default judgments where they had a wrong address on file with the Secretary of State, and consequently, did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend” (Eugene Di Lorenzio, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lumber Co., Inc., 67 NY2d 138, 141, 42, 501 NYS2d 8 [1986] [citations omitted]).“A defendant who meets the requirements of [CPLR 317] normally will be entitled to relief, although relief is not automatic, as the section states that a person meeting is requirements may be allowed to defend the action. Thus, denial of relief under CPLR 317 might be appropriate where, for example, a defendant’s failure to personally receive notice of the summons was a result of a deliberate attempt to avoid such notice” (id. at 143 [internal quotations and citations omitted]).Here, defendant’s president, Carlton Burroughs, claims that the location where plaintiff tried to serve defendant with the notice of motion for default (Apt. 1B) is vacant and that he never received a copy of the initial summons and complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 19,
