DECISION & ORDERI. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff moves to preclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert, Dr. David Gillespie, on the grounds that his opinions are uncertain, speculative, and lacking in foundation. (Docket Nos. 171 (Motion), 170 (Rimmler Decl.), 170-1 (Mem.)) She also moves to preclude documents relied on by Dr. Gillespie in forming his opinion, including journal articles and adverse incident reports, also called “MAUDE Reports.” (Id.) The Government opposes the motion. (Docket No. 173) Before the commencement of this bench trial, Plaintiff moved for the same relief. The Court denied the motion, but allowed the parties to revisit the issue during trial. Counsel are familiar with the facts and arguments, which the Court will recite only to the extent necessary to explain its ruling. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.II. DISCUSSIONA. StandardThe admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides in relevant part that “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify” to his opinion if:(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). The Rule 702 inquiry is a “flexible” one that “depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.” Floyd v. City of N.Y., 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a district court should “admit expert testimony only where it is offered by a qualified expert and is relevant and reliable,” Cohalan v. Genie Indus., Inc., No. 10-CV-2415 (JMF), 2013 WL 829150, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2013), exclusion remains “the exception rather than the rule,” Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted).“Although expert testimony should be excluded if it is speculative or conjectural, or if it is based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith, or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison, other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.” Cohalan, 2013 WL 829150, at *5 (quoting Bacardi & Co. v. N.Y. Lighter Co., No. 97-CV-7140 (JS) (VVP), 2000 WL 298915, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000)); see also McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Disputes as to the strength of [an expert's] credentials, faults in his use of differential etiology as a methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.”). As the Daubert Court itself stressed, “the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence” are not exclusion, but rather “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.B. Analysis1. Motion to Preclude Dr. Gillespie’s TestimonyPlaintiff again moves to preclude the testimony of Dr. Gillespie on the grounds that his opinions are uncertain, speculative, and lacking in foundation. Plaintiff contends, as she did in her previous motion in limine, that Dr. Gillespie should not be allowed to testify because he does not have a definitive opinion as to the cause of Howard Southard’s renal-artery blockage, and that now that “plaintiff has offered extensive evidence at trial that there was a deviation from the standard of care,” Dr. Gillespie’s “speculative” testimony “should not be permitted to contradict such uncontested facts.” (Rimmler Decl.
