Dillard, Chief Judge. Michael Findley, proceeding pro se, sued the City of Atlanta and other defendants, alleging that he suffered injuries as a result of the defendants’ negligent construction of a utility pole and anchoring guy-wire, which he struck while riding his bicycle in a park maintained by the City. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Findley then moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Findley argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without first ruling on his motion to amend the complaint to add a new party, that the Atlanta Judicial Circuit’s case-reassignment procedure was unlawful, and that the court’s summary-judgment order did not comport with the Uniform Superior Court Rules. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment before ruling on Findley’s motion to amend the complaint, and thus, we vacate that ruling and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.The record shows that on September 5, 2015, Findley was riding his bicycle on a path in the City’s West End Park when he collided with a guy-wire that was anchoring a utility pole on the path, suffering injuries as a result. On March 9, 2016, Findley filed a lawsuit against the City and John Doe defendants[1] to recover for injuries that he suffered as a result of the bicycle accident. Specifically, he alleged that the defendants acted negligently in constructing and maintaining a utility pole along a public path with an anchoring guy-wire that was difficult to see. Thereafter, the City filed responsive pleadings. Over the course of the next several months, Findley amended his complaint four times. Nevertheless, on November 2, 2016, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Findley’s claims against the City were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Rather than immediately filing a responsive brief, on December 2, 2016, Findley amended his complaint a fifth time, adding Georgia Power Company as a defendant, and a few days later, he filed a motion to amend his complaint. Subsequently, on December 19, 2016, the City filed a motion to strike Findley’s fifth amended complaint. And while Findley filed a response, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court ruled on his motion to amend.On March 27, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on all defendants’ motions for summary judgment,[2] during which Findley noted that he had moved to add Georgia Power as a defendant. Nevertheless, on March 31, 2017, the trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, indicating in the order that the case was now closed. A few days later, Findley moved for reconsideration. And on April 24, 2017, he filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s summary-judgment order. But on April 26, 2017, the trial court denied Findley’s motion for reconsideration. Then, on May 1, 2017, and prior to the trial court ruling on his motion to vacate, Findley filed a notice of appeal. This appeal follows.1. Findley contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without first ruling on his motion to amend the complaint, in which he sought to add a new party defendant. We agree. OCGA § 9-11-15 (a), in relevant part, provides:A party may amend his pleading as a matter of course and without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order. Thereafter the party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave of court shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . .
