39-2-3050 Williams v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., N.J. Super. App. Div. (Accurso, J.A.D.) (7 pp.) The Division of Workers’ Compensation dismissed the petition of Keith Williams for lack of jurisdiction. The judge of compensation determined that because Williams worked in New York and the accident happened there, there was no reason for New Jersey to assume jurisdiction of Williams’ claim. We reverse. As the facts are undisputed that Williams accepted employment from respondent by telephone from his home in Paterson, thereby establishing New Jersey as the place the contract was created, the law is clear that New Jersey is an appropriate forum for resolution of petitioner’s claim petition, certainly in conjunction with his residency here. (Approved for Publication)

14-2-3057 State v. Ancrum, N.J. Super. App. Div. (Messano, P.J.A.D.) (21 pp.) The court granted the State’s leave to appeal from an illegal sentence. Defendant was charged with second-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, second-degree aggravated assault (serious bodily injury) and third-degree aggravated assault (significant bodily injury). After indicating the assault charges would merge into the robbery under the facts of the case and the effect of the mergers would be defendant’s eligibility for special probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (the Statute), the judge accepted defendant’s guilty pleas to all four counts of the indictment. At sentencing, over the State’s continued objection, the judge sentenced defendant to special probation, conditioned on his entry into, and completion of, Drug Court. The court reversed, concluding that although the 2012 amendment to the Statute made defendants convicted of second-degree robbery and burglary eligible for special probation, the Legislature intended to continue to bar a defendant convicted of aggravated assault from receiving such a sentence. Similar to those cases in which the Legislature clearly intended certain mandatory sentences survive merger, a conviction for one of the Statute’s disqualifying offenses survives merger and bars defendant’s sentence to special probation. (Approved for Publication)

59-8-3025 In Re: Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 3rd Cir. (Fisher, J.) (51 pp.) The court considered consolidated appeals of two actions that alleged that pharmaceutical manufacturers holding the patents for Lipitor and Effexor XR delayed other manufacturers’ efforts to bring generic versions of those drugs to market by engaging in a monopolistic scheme that involved fraudulently procuring and enforcing underlying patents, and then entering reverse-payment schemes with generic manufacturers. The district court had dismissed the bulk of plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the court considered two issues of federal jurisdiction: first, whether plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent procurement and enforcement of their patents required transfer of the appeal to the Federal Circuit; second, whether plaintiffs’ action involving claims solely under California law and originally filed in California state court could be removed based on defendants’ potential patent defenses. As to the first issue, the court ruled that it could exercise appellate jurisdiction and did not need to transfer to the Federal Circuit. Citing the Court’s ruling Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, the court noted that the test for whether a case “arises under” federal patent law required the court to find that each well-pleaded claim of the plaintiff’s complaint required resolution of a patent law question. The court held that because plaintiffs could prevail on their monopolization claim by pleading an alternative, nonpatent law theory that defendants engaged in a reverse-payment settlement scheme, patent law was not required for the resolution of all of plaintiffs’ claims. As to the second issue on appeal, the court held that the district court erred in not remanding to state court, ruling that potential federal law defenses were insufficient to exercise federal jurisdiction, as the federal question had to arise from the complaint. However, the court remanded for further consideration, as the dismissal of nondiverse parties prior to final judgment could have established diversity jurisdiction. (Precedential) [Filed April 13, 2017]

46-8-3028 Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condo. Ass’n, 3rd Cir. (Restrepo, J.) (43 pp.) District court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of condominium association and individuals in appellants’ fair housing act reasonable accommodation and §3617 claims and in applying §1988(a) to hold that fair housing claims did not survive the death of a party. Reversed in part and vacated in part. Appellants, condominium residents, suffered from disabilities and were each prescribed an emotional support animal. Each obtained a dog and attempted to request an accommodation for an emotional support animal but association took no action on the requests. Other residents complained to the board about the dogs, appellants asserted their right to a service dog under the fair housing laws and the board fined appellants for violating the “no dog” rule. After a new board president was elected, appellants submitted new requests for accommodation, which were granted and the accrued fines waived. Appellants filed civil rights cases under the fair housing act asserting that the association denied their requests for accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B) and that association and named individuals interfered with the exercise of their fair housing rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §3617. One appellant died while the case was pending and appellees moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed deceased’s fair housing act claims due to her death and denied the other appellant’s fair housing claims on the merits. Appellants filed motions to substitute representatives for the deceased and appealed the dismissal of their claims. The court exercised plenary review over whether a fair housing act claim survived the death of a party and over the grant of summary judgment. The court looked to the fair housing act and found that the act was silent as to whether claims under the act survived the death of a party. The court determined that the district court erred in applying §1988(a) and, in turn, territorial law. Section 1988(a) did not apply to the fair housing act because that section applied to statutes found within three titles of the revised statutes of 1874, titles 13, 24 and 70. The fair housing act was never codified in one of those titles. The court found that a uniform rule of federal common law applied and followed the weight of authority, which applied the pre-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins common-law rule of survival, under which remedial claims survived, but penal claims did not. A fair housing act claim was remedial and claims under it survived the death of a party. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether association refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to appellants’ disabilities. Association did not argue whether an accommodation for an emotional support animal might be reasonable but argued that it never refused to provide a reasonable accommodation un-der 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(b) because appellants were never deprived of their emotional support animals. However, whether association’s actions constituted a “refusal” depended on whether association was given an opportunity to accommodate and there was a dispute of fact on that issue. The parties disputed whether appellants barred association from reviewing their paperwork or merely asked that their privacy be respected and they disputed whether board president actually reviewed the paperwork. The same factual dispute applied to appellants’ §3617 interference claim. (Precedential) [Filed March 31, 2017]

39-2-3050 Williams v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., N.J. Super. App. Div. (Accurso, J.A.D.) (7 pp.) The Division of Workers’ Compensation dismissed the petition of Keith Williams for lack of jurisdiction. The judge of compensation determined that because Williams worked in New York and the accident happened there, there was no reason for New Jersey to assume jurisdiction of Williams’ claim. We reverse. As the facts are undisputed that Williams accepted employment from respondent by telephone from his home in Paterson, thereby establishing New Jersey as the place the contract was created, the law is clear that New Jersey is an appropriate forum for resolution of petitioner’s claim petition, certainly in conjunction with his residency here. (Approved for Publication)

14-2-3057 State v. Ancrum, N.J. Super. App. Div. (Messano, P.J.A.D.) (21 pp.) The court granted the State’s leave to appeal from an illegal sentence. Defendant was charged with second-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, second-degree aggravated assault (serious bodily injury) and third-degree aggravated assault (significant bodily injury). After indicating the assault charges would merge into the robbery under the facts of the case and the effect of the mergers would be defendant’s eligibility for special probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (the Statute), the judge accepted defendant’s guilty pleas to all four counts of the indictment. At sentencing, over the State’s continued objection, the judge sentenced defendant to special probation, conditioned on his entry into, and completion of, Drug Court. The court reversed, concluding that although the 2012 amendment to the Statute made defendants convicted of second-degree robbery and burglary eligible for special probation, the Legislature intended to continue to bar a defendant convicted of aggravated assault from receiving such a sentence. Similar to those cases in which the Legislature clearly intended certain mandatory sentences survive merger, a conviction for one of the Statute’s disqualifying offenses survives merger and bars defendant’s sentence to special probation. (Approved for Publication)

59-8-3025 In Re: Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 3rd Cir. (Fisher, J.) (51 pp.) The court considered consolidated appeals of two actions that alleged that pharmaceutical manufacturers holding the patents for Lipitor and Effexor XR delayed other manufacturers’ efforts to bring generic versions of those drugs to market by engaging in a monopolistic scheme that involved fraudulently procuring and enforcing underlying patents, and then entering reverse-payment schemes with generic manufacturers. The district court had dismissed the bulk of plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the court considered two issues of federal jurisdiction: first, whether plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent procurement and enforcement of their patents required transfer of the appeal to the Federal Circuit; second, whether plaintiffs’ action involving claims solely under California law and originally filed in California state court could be removed based on defendants’ potential patent defenses. As to the first issue, the court ruled that it could exercise appellate jurisdiction and did not need to transfer to the Federal Circuit. Citing the Court’s ruling Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. , 486 U.S. 800 , the court noted that the test for whether a case “arises under” federal patent law required the court to find that each well-pleaded claim of the plaintiff’s complaint required resolution of a patent law question. The court held that because plaintiffs could prevail on their monopolization claim by pleading an alternative, nonpatent law theory that defendants engaged in a reverse-payment settlement scheme, patent law was not required for the resolution of all of plaintiffs’ claims. As to the second issue on appeal, the court held that the district court erred in not remanding to state court, ruling that potential federal law defenses were insufficient to exercise federal jurisdiction, as the federal question had to arise from the complaint. However, the court remanded for further consideration, as the dismissal of nondiverse parties prior to final judgment could have established diversity jurisdiction. (Precedential) [Filed April 13, 2017]

46-8-3028 Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condo. Ass’n, 3rd Cir. (Restrepo, J.) (43 pp.) District court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of condominium association and individuals in appellants’ fair housing act reasonable accommodation and §3617 claims and in applying §1988(a) to hold that fair housing claims did not survive the death of a party. Reversed in part and vacated in part. Appellants, condominium residents, suffered from disabilities and were each prescribed an emotional support animal. Each obtained a dog and attempted to request an accommodation for an emotional support animal but association took no action on the requests. Other residents complained to the board about the dogs, appellants asserted their right to a service dog under the fair housing laws and the board fined appellants for violating the “no dog” rule. After a new board president was elected, appellants submitted new requests for accommodation, which were granted and the accrued fines waived. Appellants filed civil rights cases under the fair housing act asserting that the association denied their requests for accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B) and that association and named individuals interfered with the exercise of their fair housing rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §3617 . One appellant died while the case was pending and appellees moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed deceased’s fair housing act claims due to her death and denied the other appellant’s fair housing claims on the merits. Appellants filed motions to substitute representatives for the deceased and appealed the dismissal of their claims. The court exercised plenary review over whether a fair housing act claim survived the death of a party and over the grant of summary judgment. The court looked to the fair housing act and found that the act was silent as to whether claims under the act survived the death of a party. The court determined that the district court erred in applying §1988(a) and, in turn, territorial law. Section 1988(a) did not apply to the fair housing act because that section applied to statutes found within three titles of the revised statutes of 1874, titles 13, 24 and 70. The fair housing act was never codified in one of those titles. The court found that a uniform rule of federal common law applied and followed the weight of authority, which applied the pre-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins common-law rule of survival, under which remedial claims survived, but penal claims did not. A fair housing act claim was remedial and claims under it survived the death of a party. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether association refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to appellants’ disabilities. Association did not argue whether an accommodation for an emotional support animal might be reasonable but argued that it never refused to provide a reasonable accommodation un-der 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(b) because appellants were never deprived of their emotional support animals. However, whether association’s actions constituted a “refusal” depended on whether association was given an opportunity to accommodate and there was a dispute of fact on that issue. The parties disputed whether appellants barred association from reviewing their paperwork or merely asked that their privacy be respected and they disputed whether board president actually reviewed the paperwork. The same factual dispute applied to appellants’ §3617 interference claim. (Precedential) [Filed March 31, 2017]