Monday's Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. Massey Coal Company has already been given a range of interpretations by commentators. By a 5-4 vote, the Court said the constitutional right to due process can sometimes require an elected judge to recuse in a case involving a campaign benefactor.

Some have called Caperton a sweeping command that will have federal courts superintending judicial elections and will prevent elected judges from voting in a case in which a campaign donor is a party.

But others -- including Justice Anthony Kennedy himself, the author of the 5-4 majority opinion -- have cast it far more narrowly, as the kind of "this trip only" constitutional ticket that will only force recusals in the kind of Grisham-like scenario that was before the high court. Namely, Caperton involved an eye-popping $3 million campaign contribution from a donor aimed at placing an individual on a court that was about to hear a case in which the donor was a party.

To sort out the meaning and implications of the Caperton ruling, we spoke with former Texas Chief Justice Thomas Phillips, now a partner at Baker Botts. Phillips authored a brief in the Caperton case on behalf of the Conference of Chief Justices. The brief, which did not support either side, instead urged the Court to articulate a standard and criteria that would guide recusal rules and decisions. The interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Q: What do you think is the main significance of Caperton?

Phillips: Caperton established a principle that is really important: There are constitutional concerns with a judge sitting in judgment of a case where a party is a significant donor. At some point, the support becomes so substantial and so overwhelming that due process requires the judge to step aside, even if neither the donor not the judge did anything illegal or even unethical. Until now, that was an unanswered issue. That's the most important thing in the case.

Q: What are the misperceptions about the ruling?

Phillips: Some have suggested that judges can never rule in any case where parties to a case or their attorneys are donors. It does no such thing. The holding, as I read it, is that due process is only violated when "[1] a person [2] with a personal stake in a particular case [3] had a significant [4] and disproportionate influence [5] in placing the judge on the case ... [6] when the case was pending or imminent." Given how narrow that holding is, I'm not sure Caperton will ever be direct precedent for another recusal.

Q: Why would the case not be a precedent?

Phillips: There just aren't a lot of cases where a large contribution can be attributed to a desire to affect the outcome of a particular case. Even the trial lawyers or the Chamber of Commerce spend millions of dollars in trying to influence the outcome of judicial races in a particular state, they are most likely spending money donated by a large number of individuals who are broadly interested in judicial philosophy. Not all of the donors will be trying to secure a particular outcome in a particular case. And unless they are, Caperton will not apply.

Q: So when Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, worries about "Caperton motions" being filed in every case to recuse a judge, you don't share that concern?

Phillips: As the majority pointed out, past constitutional recusal cases have not spawned a lot of motions. The majority opinion recognized, even urges, states to pass recusal rules that are more rigorous than the due process floor in order to ensure the appearance and reality of impartial judges. The Caperton case may cause more of those rules-based motions to be filed, and state courts may have to grapple with the types of problems that the Chief Justice raised. And, on the whole, it will be good for these rather murky questions to be fleshed out. And, moreover, it will be good to have a heightened interest in what is required to have fair and impartial justices on the bench.

Q: What could that heightened interest lead to?

Phillips: I hope this decision will spur states to focus on whether our 19th century method of selecting judges works well in the 21st century. The old friends and neighbors method of selecting a judge has been replaced by the need for expensive media campaigns to explain who the candidates are, and the vast amounts of money at stake in the civil justice system has attracted these huge independent attack ads that so damage the credibility of our justice system. Now, more than ever, states need to scrap partisan contestable elections for the courts.

Q: What does the decision say about the difference between judicial elections and other elections?

Phillips: That's another important principle in the case. No one would say that a Senator couldn't vote on armed services appropriations merely because the defense industry had spent large sums in connection with the senator's campaign. And yet that is precisely what the Court held with respect to a state judge. The opinion affirmed that, even if judges are selected in precisely the same as political officials, they have a fundamentally different role in government that raises concerns that are of constitutional magnitude.

This article first appeared on The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times.