Under the state and municipal highway defect statutes, a person injured by a defective road or sidewalk in Connecticutmust prove that the defect was the “sole proximate cause” of the injury in order to recover against the state or municipality. The problem with the sole proximate cause standard is that is impossibly confusing for juries to apply and makes little sense from a jurisprudential perspective. It’s time to replace sole proximate cause with a standard that both makes sense and achieves the policy goal of limiting the state’s overall liability for highway maintenance.

The sole proximate cause standard is actually a judicial gloss on the state and municipal highway defect statutes, neither of which contains the words “sole proximate cause.” But this judicial interpretation has enjoyed 100 or so years of legislative acquiescence and has become the law of the land for better or for worse. The judicial reasoning behind the “sole proximate cause” rule is set forth most cogently in the Connecticut Supreme Court case of White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307 1197 (1990). The court reasons the highway defect statutes are meant to provide a cause of action where an injury is caused by a highway defect. If the conduct of the driver or any third party is a substantial factor in causing the injury, the court reasons, the injury cannot truly be “caused” by the defect. Hence, the requirement that the defect be the “sole proximate cause” of the injury.